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INAUGURATION 


OF 


WILLIAM  BRENTON  GREENE,  JR.,  D.D., 


STUART   PROFESSOR 


THE   RELATIONS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AND   SCIENCE 
TO  THE  CHRISTIAN  RELIGION. 


NEW  YORK : 

ANSON   D.   F.   RANDOLPH 
&  COMPANY, 

(incortorated) 

182    FIFTH    AVENUE. 

1893. 


PREFATORY  NOTE. 


The  Rev.  William  Brenton  Greene,  Jr.,  D.D.,  was 
elected  Stuart  Professor  of  the  Relations  of  Philosophy  and 
Science  to  the  Christian  Religion  in  Princeton  Theological 
Seminary,  in  the  autumn  of  1892,  and  assumed  the  duties  of 
the  chair  provisionally  from  January,  1893.  His  formal  in- 
duction into  the  chair  was  postponed  until  his  election  to  it 
could  be  duly  reported  to  the  Gen  eral  Assembly.  It  took 
place  on  Friday,  September  22,  1893,  at  11.30  o'clock,  in  the 
First  Presbyterian  Church  of  Princeton.  The  order  of  exer- 
cises on  this  occasion  was  as  follows : 

Hymn. 

Prayer,  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  Willis  Green  Craig,  Professor  in  McCor- 
mick  Theological  Seminary,  Moderator  of  the  General  Assembly. 

Administration  of  the  Pledge  to  the  New  Professor,  by  the 
Rev,  Dr.  A.  Gosman,  President  of  the  Board  of  Directors. 

The  Charge,  by  the  Rev.  Ebenezer  Erskine,  D.D.,  Pastor  of  the 

Big  Spring  Presbyterian  Church,  Newville,  Pa. 
The  Inaugural  Address,  by  Professor  Greene. 

Hymn. 

Benediction,  by  the  Rev.  Dr.  James  McCosh,  ex-President  of  the 
College  of  New  Jersey. 


The  Charge  and  Inaugural  Address  are  here  published  by  order  of 
the  Board  of  Directors. 


THE  CHARGE. 


THE  REV.  EBENEZER  ERSKINE,  D.D. 


CHARGE. 


My  Dear  Brother: 

In  the  performance  of  the  duty  assigned  me  in  connection 
with  these  Inaugural  services,  allow  me  at  the  outset  to  con- 
gratulate you  and  all  the  friends  of  this  venerable  school  of 
sacred  learning,  in  view  of  the  favorable  auspices  under  which 
you  enter  formally  upon  the  duties  of  the  chair  into  which 
you  have  just  been  inducted,  and  with  which  this  new  term 
of  the  Seminary  now  opens.  A  little  more  than  a  year  ago 
all  our  hearts  were  greatly  saddened  by  reason  of  the  ravages 
of  death  among  the  teaching  force  of  this  institution,  no  less 
than  three  members  of  the  Faculty  having  been  thus  removed 
in  one  year.  To-day  we  are  permitted  to  rejoice  in  seeing 
these  vacancies  all  filled,  the  Faculty  enlarged,  our  curriculum 
of  study  broadened,  the  endowments  preserved,  a  new  and 
most  commodious  dormitory  completed  and  ready  for  occupa- 
tion, and  a  larger  number  of  students  assembled  than  ever 
before  at  the  opening  of  any  Seminary  year.  In  this  connec- 
tion I  may  be  permitted  further  to  say,  that  to  me,  as  a 
member  of  the  Board  of  Directors,  the  guiding  and  overruling 
hand  of  God  has  seldom  appeared  more  visible  than  it  has  in 
the  filling  of  the  chairs  of  this  Seminary.  With  respect  to 
your  own  individual  selection  for  the  chair  you  now  occupy, 
I  may  say  that  it  was  a  matter  of  the  most  careful  delibera- 
tion. The  committee  in  charge  of  the  nomination  canvassed 
the  whole  field  of  the  Church  for  months  in  quest  of  the  right 
man  for  the  place,  and  after  long  and  patient  inquiry  came  to 
an  unanimous  agreement  to  present  your  name  as  that  of  the 
one  in  their  judgment  best  qualified  for  the  position.  Their 
nomination  was  unanimously  confirmed  by  the  Board  of 
Directors,  and  met  with  a  like  concurrence  upon  the  part  of 
the  Faculty.     And  now,  your  appointment  having  been  ap- 


8  Charge. 

proved  by  the  General  Assembly,  we  are  here  to-day  for  its 
final  ratification  by  these  inaugural  solemnities.  Your  elec- 
tion having  thus  received  the  cordial  sanction  of  all  your 
brethren  charged  with  the  care  of  the  sacred  interests  of  this 
institution,  and  also  that  of  the  whole  Church,  we  have  good 
reason  to  hope  and  believe  that  it  has  also  the  approval  of 
the  Church's  Great  Head.  Under  these  circumstances  it  gives 
me  great  pleasure  to  welcome  you  to  this  high  and  responsible 
position,  and  to  express  to  you  the  sincere  desire  of  all  our 
hearts  that  you  may,  by  the  blessing  of  God,  be  eminently 
successful  in  the  discharge  of  its  duties.  Having  already 
entered  upon  your  work  for  a  season,  and  realized  the  ex- 
pectations of  all  concerned,  your  future  acceptance  and  use- 
fulness as  an  instructor  in  your  department  can  scarcely  be 
regarded  as  an  experiment. 

In  any  such  recognition  of  the  prosperity  of  this  Seminary 
as  has  been  made,  or  inquiry  into  the  sources  of  it,  we  must 
take  into  consideration  not  only  the  eminent  abilities  and 
learning  of  the  professors  who  have  successively  occupied  the 
several  chairs,  but  more  especially  the  gracious  care  of  God, 
whose  favor  has  rested  upon  this  institution  from  the  begin- 
ning, and  the  spirit  of  genuine  piety  which  has  characterized 
its  entire  administration.  While  this  Seminary  has  sought 
to  keep  fully  abreast  of  the  Biblical  learning  and  scholar- 
ship of  the  age,  it  has  at  the  same  time  given  special  care  to 
the  cultivation  of  the  personal  piety  of  the  students,  and 
never  exalted  speculative  theology  at  the  expense  of  personal 
religious  experience.  Its  entire  history  has  been  characterized 
no  less  by  a  diligent  cultivation  of  a  spirit  of  humble  evan- 
gelical piety  than  it  has  by  an  inflexible  adherence  to  sound 
doctrine.  Here  is  the  secret  of  its  growth  and  prosperity. 
And  this  Seminar}',  in  my  judgment,  was  never  better  equipped 
for  its  great  work,  nor  more  worthy  of  the  confidence  of  the 
Church  at  large,  than  it  is  at  this  present  time. 

In  addressing  you  in  relation  to  the  importance,  duties,  and 
responsibilities  of  your  chair,  my  time  will  only  allow  a  hasty 
glance  at  these  points.     You  are  doubtless  aware  that  you  are 


Charge.  9 

entering  upon  your  work  at  a  period  of  great  theological  un- 
rest ;  at  a  period  when  the  very  foundations  of  Christian  belief 
are  being  violently  assailed  ;  a  time  when  truths  long  accepted 
are  brought  into  debate;  a  time  when  the  very  principles 
upon  which  the  certitude  of  belief  rests  are  called  into  ques- 
tion. Everything  in  your  department  is  disputed.  Every 
position  heretofore  held  is  challenged  ;  every  principle  is 
questioned,  and  every  conclusion  denied.  In  the  estimation  of 
some  of  our  most  learned  men,  among  whom  may  be  mentioned 
the  venerable  father  of  our  own  Board,  the  Rev.  Dr.  James 
McCosh,  who  has  rendered  such  signal  service  in  behalf  of  a 
sound  Intuitional  philosophy,  things  are  in  a  most  unsettled 
condition.  All  subjects  of  human  speculation  require  a  re- 
discussion  with  a  view  to  determine  what  are  the  first  and 
ultimate  principles  of  truth.* 

Be  this  as  it  may,  while  your  chair  is  denominated  "The 
Relations  of  Philosophy  and  Science  to  the  Christian  Religion," 
it  covers  the  whole  department  of  Apologetics.  The  work  of 
the  Apologist  was  never  more  urgent  or  more  important  than 
now.  Your  department  in  reference  to  the  more  advanced 
and  much  extended  curriculum  of  theological  study  here 
pursued  may  be  said  to  be  introductory  and  preparatory.  In 
a  certain  sense  yours  is  a  work  of  exploration  and  discovery. 
You  start  out  from  first  principles,  from  self-evident  truths, 
from  truths  intuitively  seen  and  generally  admitted — and 
assuming  the  trustworthiness  of  sense-perceptions  and  of  the 
facts  of  consciousness  and  mental  operations;  relying  thus 
upon  those  principles  which  are  not  acquired  by  experience, 
but  which  are  implanted  in  the  constitution  of  our  nature  ; 
having  this  ground  on  which  to  stand,  and  these  implements 
with  which  to  work,  you  start  out  and  advance  step  by  step, 
according  to  the  most  approved  scientific  method,  to  find 
your  way,  first,  to  God — to  the  knowledge  and  belief  of  an 
extramundane,  Personal  God  ;  and,  then,  from  God  to  a  written, 
inspired,  divine  revelation. 


♦  Scottish  Philosophy,  p.  460. 


lo  Charge, 

You  are  not  set  here  as  a  teacher  of  theology  or  as  an  inter- 
preter of  Scripture.  It  is  for  you  to  show  that  "the  invisible 
things  of  God,  even  His  eternal  power  and  Godhead,  are  to 
be  clearly  seen  from  the  things  which  are  made,"  and  that 
God  has  manifested  His  being  and  attributes  in  the  works  of 
nature,  in  history,  in  man,  as  well  as  in  His  Word,  and  in  the 
Incarnation,  life,  and  doctrines  of  Jesus  Christ,  His  Eternal 
Son.  In  doing  this  it  will  devolve  upon  you  to  prove  the 
existence  of  mind  as  distinct  from  matter,  to  establish  the 
reality  of  the  supernatural  in  order  to  the  possibility  of  a 
divine  revelation — in  other  words,  to  establish  the  existence 
of  a  Personal  God,  and  the  possibility,  probability,  necessity, 
and  reality  of  a  written,  plenarily  inspired  divine  revelation, 
and  to  marshal  the  evidences,  external  and  internal,  of  its 
divine  origin.  Apologetics  is  that  one  of  the  theological  dis- 
ciplines which  vindicates  the  right  of  Christianity  to  exist.  It 
is  the  defence  of  the  Christian  Religion  against  all  forms  of 
anti-Christian  speculation.  The  Christian  apologist  has  to  do 
chiefly  with  two  questions:  i.  Is  there  a  Personal  God  who 
can  be  known  ?  2.  Is  Christianity  what  it  claims  to  be,  a 
supernatural  communication  from  God  to  men?  As  all 
theology  roots  itself  in  the  idea  of  a  Personal  God,  there  can 
be  no  theology,  no  divine  revelation,  if  there  be  no  such 
God.  Christianity  is  founded  upon  the  presupposition  of  the 
divine  existence,  and  upon  the  possibility  of  a  divine  revela- 
tion. The  divine  existence  must  therefore  be  either  assumed 
or  proven  before  you  can  advance  to  the  consideration  of  a 
divine  revelation. 

By  reason  of  an  arrangement  which  had  been  adopted  prior 
to  your  election,  the  question  of  Theism,  one  of  the  great 
questions  of  the  present  age,  is  assigned  to  Dr.  Francis  L. 
Patton  as  its  able  teacher  and  defender.  You  are  therefore 
happily  relieved  of  the  responsibility  of  this  important  ele- 
ment of  Apologetics.  Assuming  therefore  the  divine  existence, 
you  are  permitted  to  advance  at  once  to  the  great  work  of 
vindicating  the  Bible  as  a  divine  revelation,  and  to  showing 
the  defensible  character  of  Christianity  against  the  assaults  of 


Charge.  1 1 

all  who  would  deny  its  supernatural  origin,  refuse  it  recogni- 
tion as  of  divine  authority,  or  acknowledgment  as  the  ulti- 
mate, the  universal,  and  the  exclusive  religion  from  God  for 
men. 

I  take  it  to  be  the  general  object  of  your  chair  to  vindicate 
Christianity  as  that  system  of  religious  faith  and  worship 
which  rests  upon  the  authority  of  the  sure  word  of  God,  and 
to  defend  it  against  all  forms  of  doubt  and  skepticism  ;  and  its 
more  specific  object  to  be  the  consideration  of  the  "  Relations 
of  Philosophy  and  Science  to  the  Christian  Religion."  In 
these  times  of  great  laxity  of  religious  views  and  abounding 
worldliness  among  those  who  profess  and  call  themselves 
Christians,  when  so  much  passes  under  the  Christian  name 
that  is  vague,  nominal,  and  spurious, — to  say  nothing  of  what 
is  held  in  the  higher  realms  of  philosophical  skepticism  and 
practical  unbelief, — it  is  very  necessary  to  define  what  the 
Christian  religion  means  for  us.  It  must  ever  be  held  to  be  a 
religion  divinely  revealed  through  authentic  agents,  duly  ac- 
credited divine  messengers,  and  a  system  of  grace  for  the  sal- 
vation of  sinful  men.  A  religion  that  recognizes  neither  sin 
nor  salvation  is  not  the  religion  of  the  Bible.  Nor  is  it  enough 
to  say  that  it  provides  a  way  whereby  men  may  worship  God 
through  Jesus  Christ.  Very  diverse  forms  of  religions  profess 
to  do  this.  It  should  mean  at  least  what  Dr.  Patton,  the  first 
incumbent  of  this  chair,  was  pleased  to  say  it  meant  for  him, 
"the  full  and  true  expression  of  the  mind  of  God  respecting 
faith,  worship,  and  obedience."  Religion  may  exist  in  the 
form  of  reverence,  love,  and  trust  toward  God,  or  it  may  take 
the  shape  of  a  thoroughly  digested  system  of  divine  truth  in 
the  mind.  In  the  cases  of  De  Wette  and  Dr.  Chalmers,  the 
scientific  form  preceded  the  spiritual  and  the  practical. 

The  natural  tendency  of  the  mind  to  classify  its  knowledge, 
of  whatever  kind,  impels  it  to  arrange  its  religious  beliefs  in 
systematic  order,  and  to  examine  into  the  foundations  of  those 
beliefs.  It  wants  to  know  what  arc  the  proofs  of  the  divine 
existence,  and  what  arc  the  evidences  of  a  divine  revelation. 
Apologetics  has  for  its  object  a  scientific  answer  to  these  in- 


1 2  Charge. 

quiries.  The  two  burning  questions  of  our  times  are,  the  real- 
ity of  the  supernatural,  and  the  divine  origin  and  trustworthi- 
ness of  the  Sacred  Scriptures.  The  Apologist's  work  is  to  es- 
tablish the  one  and  vindicate  the  o*^her. 

Theology  may  begin  with  a  Theistic  theory  of  the  universe, 
or  with  divine  revelation,  which  assumes  the  divine  existence. 
Philosophy,  which  covers  the  whole  range  of  human  intelli- 
gence, begins  with  the  primitive  and  more  remote  facts  of 
mind  and  matter,  from  which  it  argues  the  existence  of  God 
and  the  possibility  and  authority  of  divine  revelation.  It  calls 
for  accurate  and  valid  knowledge  of  those  facts,  which  are  the 
foundation  both  of  philosophy  and  theology.  "Apologetics 
puts  reason  and  revelation  in  their  true  relations.  Reason 
states  the  problems,  and  revelation  gives  the  solution."  *  The 
denial  of  the  divine  existence  leaves  the  problem  of  the  uni- 
verse unsolved  and  unsolvable. 

In  the  light  of  these  statements,  yours  is  the  work  of  the 
Christian  philosopher.  It  is  for  you  to  find  out  whether  a 
Theistic  conception  of  the  universe  has  a  valid  basis  of  facts, 
and  a  valid  knowledge  of  those  facts  on  which  to  rest.  "  The 
Bible  appeals  to  the  intelligence  of  man  for  its  acceptance, 
subjecting  to  rational  tests  not  only  its  evidences,  but  also  its 
teachings.  The  full  breadth  of  the  argument  in  exposition 
and  defence  of  Christianity  is  seen  only  by  starting  from  the 
position  that  all  religion,  whatever  its  form,  rests  on  a  rational 
basis."  t  Philosophy  is  thus  the  handmaid  of  religion,  and 
not  necessarily  a  rival  or  hostile  system.  In  getting  your 
theory  of  the  universe,  you  must  combine  the  facts  of  revela- 
tion with  the  facts  of  consciousness;  for  it  is  only  through 
consciousness  that  we  can  have  a  knowledge  of  either.  "  We 
stand,"  as  has  been  said,  "  between  God  and  the  world,  and 
we  must  interpret  both  by  mind.  And,  in  order  to  such  in- 
terpretation, we  must  have  a  philosophy  of  mind."  %     It  is  in 


*  H.  B.  Smith's  Apologetics. 

t  Science  and  Religion,  Calderwood,  p.  27. 

X  Strong's  Philosophy  and  Religion,  pp.  3,  4. 


Charge.  1 3 

vain,  therefore,  to  decry  all  philosophy.  It  was  the  study  of 
Aristotle  that  made  theology  a  science,  and  the  minted  coin 
of  Calvin's  Institutes  such  an  advance  upon  the  massive  ore  of 
Augustine.  It  was  the  philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  that 
disciplined  the  forces  of  theology,  and  made  them  systematic. 
And  "  still  these  sceptred  kings  of  abstract  thought  control 
the  minds  of  men,  and  rule  us  from  their  urns." 

A  true  knowledge  of  mind  is  necessary  to  a  true  knowledge 
of  God  and  of  revelation.  The  Christian  believer,  however, 
who  accepts  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments 
as  the  very  Word  of  God,  cannot  allow  any  system  of  philoso- 
phy which  is  the  mere  product  of  human  intelligence  to 
dominate  the  teachings  and  authority  of  Holy  Scripture,  or 
his  interpretations  of  the  same.  But,  availing  himself  of  the 
aid  of  philosophy  within  its  own  sphere,  he  can  accept  its  as- 
sistance in  the  consideration  of  the  evidences  which  go  to  cer- 
tify that  what  Christianity  claims  for  itself  is  true ;  and  when 
well  satisfied  of  this,  he  can  still  further  invoke  its  aid — in  de- 
pendence upon  the  aid  of  the  Holy  Spirit — in  order  that  he 
may,  in  an  humble,  reverent,  and  teachable  spirit,  ascertain 
the  true  sense  of  Scripture.  But,  while  philosophy  is  a  good 
servant  to  theological  inquiry,  it  is  often  a  bad  master. 

In  philosophy,  all  consciousness  involves  duality  of  concep- 
tion :  conception  of  matter,  and  conception  of  mind.  Desire 
for  unity  impels  the  mind  to  seek  to  combine  these  differing 
conceptions,  and  either  to  accept  the  one  and  deny  the  other, 
or  to  combine  both  in  one,  declaring  both  to  be  only  differing 
forms  of  one  and  the  same  substance.  While  to  do  this  in- 
volves the  denial  of  the  most  palpable  facts,  yet  one  scheme 
of  philosophy  after  another  has  been  built  up  in  this  way,  on 
one  or  other  of  these  two  elements,  the  other  being  wholly  ig- 
nored. In  all  knowledge  there  is  a  real  unity,  yet  this  passion 
for  unity  has  its  limitations.  The  facts  of  consciousness  must 
determine  the  nature  of  this  unity,  and  set  bounds  to  its  con- 
trolling influence. 

By  reason  of  the  great  advances  made  in  the  physical  sciences 
and   the  much  wider  sphere  over  which  human   philosophy 


t4  Charge. 

ranges,  and  the  antagonisms  developed  between  them  and  di- 
vine revelation,  it  is  the  prerogative  of  Apologetics  to  keep 
them  in  their  respective  spheres  and  in  their  true  relations. 
As  the  Being  of  God  and  the  claims  of  divine  revelation  have 
been  especially  assailed  by  scientists  and  philosophers  of  our 
time,  it  is  incumbent  upon  those  who  are  set  for  the  defence 
of  the  Christian  religion  to  show  the  harmony  which,  of  neces- 
sity, exists  between  all  true  science  and  all  sound  philosophy 
and  divine  revelation.  In  the  prosecution  of  this  high  en- 
deavor, you  will  be  obliged  to  discriminate  sharply  between 
the  pretensions  of  science,  falsely  so  called — against  which  we 
are  warned  in  the  Scriptures — and  science  which  is  based  on 
facts  carefully  ascertained  ;  between  mere  hypotheses  and  laws 
which  are  the  logical  deductions  from  facts  adequately  ob- 
served. By  reason  of  the  increased  facilities  for  investigation, 
a  wider  range  of  knowledge,  and  better  results  gathered  under 
carefully  tested  scientific  methods,  there  has  been  great  ad- 
vance in  the  physical  sciences.  But  such  an  advance  does  not 
necessarily  unsettle  any  well-founded  religious  convictions. 
The  war  between  hypothesis  and  dogma  has  been  almost  un- 
ceasing in  these  modern  times ;  but,  where  any  real  ground 
for  conflict  existed,  it  was  because  one  or  the  other,  or  both, 
were  unfounded. 

In  the  consideration,  therefore,  of  the  relation  of  the  sciences 
to  the  Christian  religion,  especially  the  physical  sciences,  it  is 
a  sufficient  guarantee  of  peace  between  them  for  all  concerned 
to  be  duly  informed  that  each  has  its  own  sphere,  and  that  the 
boundaries  between  them  admit  of  being  clearly  defined  ;  and 
that,  so  long  as  each  one  restricts  itself  to  its  own  territory, 
there  need  be  no  strife  between  them.  The  physical  sciences 
have  to  do  with  observed  facts  and  the  laws  which  govern 
them.  Christianity  does  not  enter  on  this  sphere,  nor  in  any 
way  question  the  legitimacy  of  these  processes,  and  is  in  no 
wise  endangered  by  any  legitimate  scientific  progress.  This  fact 
should  be  proclaimed  from  all  our  housetops,  as  well  as  from  the 
chair  of  Apologetics.  All  apprehensions  on  this  score  upon 
the  part  of  Christian  people  should  be  put  to  rest  as  groundless. 


Charge.  1 5 

Christianity,  however,  refuses  to  be  restricted  to  such  ex- 
ternal observations,  or  to  be  tied  down  to  mere  sense-percep- 
tions, and  has  no  controversy  with  science  in  her  diligent  in- 
quiry into  the  facts  and  secret  laws  of  nature ;  but  is  ever 
ready  to  rejoice  over  every  legitimate  conquest  which  is  thus 
made.  This  is  only  saying,  as  Prof.  Calderwood  has  so  well 
observed,  "  that  love  of  truth,  and  submission  to  the  laws  of 
evidence,  are  characteristics  of  all  disciplined  intelligence." 
The  simple  question  at  issue  between  the  theological  and  sci- 
entific world  is:  Is  there  any  real  ground  for  conflict  between 
the  historical  facts  and  revealed  truths  of  Scripture,  as  under- 
stood and  accepted  by  those  who  profess  and  call  them- 
selves Christians,  and  the  well-ascertained  facts  and  laws  of 
nature? 

Much  has  been  said  about  conflict  between  science  and  the 
Christian  religion,  but  little  has  been  done  in  the  way  of 
pointing  out  precisely  where  this  conflict  lies,  or  in  determin- 
ing exactly  in  what  it  consists. 

There  has  been  conflict  between  the  false  pretences  of 
science  and  the  solid  claims  of  true  religion,  and  there  has 
been  conflict  between  true  advances  made  by  science  and 
wrong  interpretations  of  the  divine  revelation.  The  chief  con- 
flict between  science  and  religion  "  has  been  due  to  diversities 
of  interpretation  and  application  alike  among  the  upholders 
of  Christianity,  and  among  the  expounders  of  science."  Such 
diversities  are  the  necessary  accompaniments  of  freedom  of 
thought,  and  essential  conditions  of  any  true  progress  in 
knowledge,  whether  in  science  or  religion.  It  has  been  ac- 
knowledged with  regret  that,  hitherto,  most  of  the  noise  of 
conflict  between  science  and  religion  has  arisen  from  a  too 
hasty  disposition  to  charge  rationalistic  or  skeptical  conclu- 
sions as  the  necessary  result  of  certain  scientific  hypotheses, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  from  a  like  too  great  readiness  to  infer 
that  certain  newly  recognized  facts  must  prove  damaging  to 
Christian  faith.  By  the  one  side,  certain  scientific  theories 
have  been  assailed  with  needless  apprehension  and  severity; 
by  the  other,  there  has  been  too  great  eagerness  to  interpret 


1 6  Charge, 

scientific  theories  as  adverse  to  Christian  doctrine,  and  to  do 
so  with  an  undisguised  hostile  feeling.* 

Christianity  rests  her  claims  upon  an  authoritative  divine 
revelation,  duly  recorded  in  the  inspired  books  of  the  Jewish 
and  Christian  canons  of  Scripture.  Natural  science  cannot  le- 
gitimately enter  the  domain  of  divine  revelation  and  attempt 
to  deal  with  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  the  universe,  or  deny 
the  supernatural.  To  do  so,  it  cannot  afifirm,  as  some  do,  that 
there  are  no  facts  but  those  of  external  observation,  and  that 
there  are  no  legitimate  inductions  of  truth  save  those  which 
are  derived  from  the  sense-perceptions.  Philosophy  may  chal- 
lenge the  reality  of  the  supernatural,  and  call  for  the  facts 
which  go  to  sustain  it,  but  the  natural  sciences  have  no  ground 
to  stand  upon  when  they  attempt  to  do  so. 

While  this  is  plainly  true,  it  is  undeniable  that  this  has  not 
been  the  uniform  attitude  of  certain  leaders  in  the  natural 
sciences.  Christianity  has  been  especially  assailed,  as  Prof. 
Calderwood  puts  it,  "  from  the  region  of  scientific  inference." 
By  saying  so,  he  meant  to  discriminate  between  its  being  as- 
sailed by  science,  which  he  holds  to  be  impossible,  and  by  sci- 
entific men — men  distinguished  in  their  respective  depart- 
ments of  science,  who  yet  go  out  of  their  way  to  draw  in- 
ferences unfriendly  to  Christianity. 

This  brings  us  on  to  the  great  battlefield  of  the  age — the 
battle  ground  where  the  great  thinkers  of  our  times  divide 
and  are  arrayed  in  open,  earnest  conflict  on  the  great  question 
of  the  reality  of  the  supernatural.  He  who  goes  into  this 
arena  will  need  to  look  well  to  his  equipment  and  to  the 
sources  of  his  strength.  He  will  need  to  have  an  intelligent 
and  well-grounded  faith  in  the  foundation  principles  of  his 
system  ;  a  thorough  conviction  of  its  defensibility  and  a  cor- 
rect theory  of  defence.  "  He  must  be  prepared  to  follow 
when  the  battle  leads,  as  lead  it  will,  into  the  fundamental 
question  of  the  philosophy  of  belief."  The  field  swarms  with 
all  manner  of  assailants  of  the  supernatural,  with   scientists, 


*  See  Prof.  Calderwood 's  Science  and  Religion,  pp.  20,  21. 


Charge.  1 7 

historical  critics,  and  with  the  representatives  of  the  various 
schools  of  the  materialistic  philosophy,  and  especially  with 
the  adherents  of  the  revived  system  of  Comte,  and  its  affir- 
mation "  that  we  know  nothing  but  the  phenomena  of  matter, 
and  that  mind,  if  there  be  such  a  thing,  lies  wholly  out  of  the 
reach  of  direct  observation,"  and  its  "  denial  of  causes,  both 
efficient  and  final,"*  which  leads  necessarily  to  materialism, 
pantheism,  and  atheism.  The  battle  is  being  waged  with  the 
utmost  skill  and  vigor.  Messengers  are  flying  here  and  there 
over  the  field  bearing  despatches  as  to  the  weakest  points  for 
assault  and  the  strongest  positions  of  defence.  The  enemy  is 
bold  and  defiant.  It  is  signalled  far  and  wide  "  that  belief  in 
God  has  been  disintegrated  by  the  widening  of  knowledge, 
and  that  accordingly  belief  in  a  supernatural  order  of  things 
has  passed  away." 

You  need  not,  my  dear  brother,  tremble  at  the  noise  of  the 
conflict,  "  nor  mistake  the  boasting  of  those  who  are  putting 
on  the  armor  for  the  shout  of  final  victory."  No  effective 
battle  can  here  be  given  by  natural  scientists.  It  is  with  the 
critics  and  the  adherents  of  a  false  philosophy  that  you  will 
chiefly  have  to  do.  The  essential  principle  of  these  anti- 
Theistic  and  skeptical  schools  is  to  be  seen  in  their  attitude  to- 
ward truth  and  knowledge.  They  refuse  to  believe  in  God 
and  spiritual  things,  and  base  their  refusal  on  the  allegation, 
**  that  the  human  mind  is  inherently  and  constitutionally  in- 
capable of  knowing  whether  there  is  a  God  and  spiritual 
things  or  not."  This  is  the  arbitrary  assumption  on  which 
their  system  rests.  "  They  deny  the  trustworthiness  of  the 
human  mind  in  regard  to  its  normal  perceptions,  and  affirm 
that  its  natural  and  necessary  laws  are  not  to  be  depended 
on."  They  ignore  the  fundamental  condition  of  all  knowledge. 
The  older  and  more  ordinary  forms  of  infidelity  rested  upon 
the  allegation  of  inadequate  evidence  for  valid  belief.  But 
these  schools  of  unbelief  base  their  dissent  on  the  ground  that 
the  mind  is  incapable  of  deriving  probable  certainty  from  all 


♦Augustus  H.  Strong,  Philosophy  and  Religion,  pp.  9,  10. 


1 8  Charge. 

the  evidences  presented.  It  is  not  so  much  against  all  forms 
of  knowledge  that  this  materialistic  philosophy  is  applied  in 
our  day.  Its  whole  force  is  turned  chiefly  against  the  super- 
natural and  the  spiritual,  as  pertaining  to  the  unknown  and 
unknowable. 

I  have  thus  dwelt  on  these  things  for  the  purpose  of  em- 
phasizing the  great  need  of  a  thorough  and  accurate  training 
of  our  candidates  for  the  ministry  and  all  other  educated 
young  men,  at  least  in  the  essential  principles  of  mental  and 
moral  science  and  in  the  laws  and  methods  of  sound  scientific 
reasoning.  And  as  students  are  coming  to  this  Seminary  from 
all  quarters  of  the  globe,  and  with  every  variety  of  previous 
mental  discipline,  and  with  most  defective  habits  of  thought 
and  modes  of  reasoning,  I  beg  to  suggest  whether  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  fundamental  principles  of  these  sciences,  after  the 
manner  of  Dr.  Archibald  Alexander,  fifty  years  ago,  is  not  a 
necessity,  seeing  how  certain  principles  of  mental  philosophy, 
whether  sensational  or  intuitional,  are  dominating  the  religious 
thinking  of  the  age. 

Three  things  are  absolutely  necessary  in  this  connection  :  a 
true  doctrine  of  belief,  a  true  doctrine  of  knowledge,  and  a 
true  doctrine  of  evidence.  To  protect  the  young  men  from 
the  baleful  influence  of  a  materialistic  philosophy,  they  must 
be  taught  to  pay  a  due  regard  to  the  facts  of  consciousness, 
to  first  principles,  to  the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  mind, 
and  to  the  laws  of  correct  reasoning.  There  is  nothing,  after 
all,  absolutely  new  in  all  this  agnostic  school  of  thought,  as  has 
been  shown  by  Professor  Flint.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  and 
Dean  Mansel's  doctrine,  "  that  the  infinite  cannot  be  known," 
and  "  that  God  is  therefore  not  an  object  of  knowledge,  but  of 
faith,"  has  been  traced  to  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge.  In 
like  manner  it  has  been  shown  that  Herbert  Spencer's  system 
is  rooted  in  Mansel's  and  Hamilton's  doctrine  of  the  infinite 
and  in  Hume's  doctrine  of  experience.  Good  service  has  been 
rendered  in  this  connection  to  the  Church  at  large  by  Dr. 
Howard  Osgood,  of  Rochester,  N.  Y.,  in  showing  how  these 
boasted   schools  of  modern  doubt  are  given  to  the  work  of 


Charge.  19 

refurbishing  old  weapons  of  infidel  warfare,  and  to  brandishing 
them  before  the  world  as  something  new  and  of  transcendent 
strength  and  brilliancy.  The  fact  developed  that,  after  a 
period  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  years,  Kuenen  and  his 
followers,  as  seen  in  the  latest  productions  of  Dr.  Driver,  of 
Oxford,  England,  and  Dr.  Cornill,  of  Konigsberg,  Germany, 
have  only  reproduced  the  methods  and  results  of  Reimarus, 
of  Hamburg,  of  1767 — and  that  these  methods  and  results 
were  not  new  with  him,  he  having  derived  them  largely  from 
Voltaire,  while  Voltaire  borrowed  them  from  the  English 
Deists  and  French  atheists  near  the  beginning  of  the  last 
century,  and  from  J  ulian,  Porphyry  and  Celsus,  of  the  third  and 
fourth  centuries,  Julian  having  been  with  him  a  favorite 
author  : — when  it  has  thus  been  shown  that  the  same  methods 
had  been  pursued  by  Reimarus  and  his  skeptical  predecessors 
as  in  these  Introductions  of  Professors  Driver  and  Cornill, 
with  parallel  results,  it  reveals  the  audacity  of  such  statements 
for  us  then  to  be  told  by  the  biographer  of  Kuenen,  "  that 
he  (Kuenen)  has  with  singular  boldness  shaken  the  tradition 
of  Christian  piety  free  from  every  trace  of  supernaturalism 
and  implied  exclusiveness";  that  "he  has  forced  the  absolute 
surrender  of  the  orthodox  dogmatics  and  of  the  authority  of 
the  Scriptures";  and  that  it  has  been  shown  from  history 
"  that  the  only  claim  which  Jesus  of  Nazareth  has  to  our 
affections  and  gratitude  is  for  what  he  as  a  man  has  been 
and  has  done  for  men." 

We  live,  my  brother,  in  what  has  been  styled  the  analytical 
and  critical  age  of  the  Church.  We  lay  great  stress  upon  the 
right  of  private  judgment,  and  too  little  upon  what  Prof. 
Flint  calls  the  correlative  truth  "  of  judging  rightly."  The 
right  of  private  judgment  and  independent  action,  while  the 
essential  conditions  of  true  freedom  of  thought  and  progress 
in  knowledge,  yet,  if  left  unrestrained  by  sound  principles  of 
conduct  and  rightful  authority,  tends  to  rash  assaults  upon 
long-established  systems  of  belief,  and  to  violent  revolutions 
in  civil  and  social  order.  True  progress  is  not  mere  change 
of  opinions,  or  the  uprooting  of  the  foundations  of  verified 


20  Charge. 

knowledge.  If  truth  has  been  once  adequately  established,  it 
is  to  be  held  fast  as  of  imperishable  value,  and  never  to  be 
relinquished. 

The  new  science  of  comparative  religions  will  also  claim 
your  attention.  You  know  its  origin  and  its  results.  It  was 
a  reaction  from  the  natural  theology  of  Palcy,  Butler,  and 
Chalmers.  Its  contributions,  however,  to  natural  theology, 
like  those  of  natural  history  to  anthropology,  have  been  of 
little  value.  At  the  same  time,  this  historical  survey  of  the 
natural  religions  of  the  world  has  borne  good  fruit,  in  that  it 
has  given  testimony  to  certain  well-known  and  generally 
admitted  truths:  i.  To  the  fact  that  man  is  a  religious  being; 
2.  To  man's  need  of  God,  and  to  his  having  sufficient  capacity 
to  know  something  of  Him  ;  3.  To  the  fact  that  a  capacity  to 
know  God,  and  actual  knowledge  of  Him,  are  things  very 
different. 

The  argument  derived  from  this  science  agamst  Christianity, 
to  the  effect  that  all  these  religions  have  professed  to  be 
founded  upon  divine  revelations,  and  have  claimed  super- 
natural sanctions,  is  of  no  force.  It  is  one  thing  to  set  up 
such  claims,  and  another  thing  to  establish  them. 

No  amount  of  assumption  or  pretension  is  sufficient  to 
justify  the  rejection  of  the  well-founded  claims  of  Christianity 
to  a  divine  origin,  with  all  its  credentials  and  evidences,  which 
are  to  be  determined  on  their  own  merits.  Over  against  all 
such  claims  are  to  be  arrayed  the  sources  and  evidences  of 
Christianity,  its  possibility,  historical  character,  and  necessity 
in  order  to  the  religious  life  and  salvation  of  men,  its  actual 
intrusion  into  history  as  a  divine  force,  and  the  production  of 
a  new  and  divine  life  in  the  experience  of  mankind,  culminat- 
ing in  the  Person  and  life  of  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ  as  the  per- 
fect revelation  of  God. 

You  take  your  chair,  therefore,  as  an  accredited  defender  of 
Christianity  against  all  who  would  deny  its  divine  origin,  its 
supernatural  revelations,  its  inspired  records,  and  its  exclusive 
claims  to  acceptance  among  men.  While  the  Bible  is  its  own 
best  defence,  and  carries  on  its  face  the  marks  of  its  own  high 


Charge.  21 

origin;  while  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  greatest  Apologist  and 
witness  to  the  truth  of  God ;  and  while  the  faith  of  God's 
people  rests  chiefly  upon  historical  facts  and  spiritual  intui- 
tions :  yet,  if  we  are  to  go  into  the  arena  of  debate,  and  expect 
to  make  headway  with  unbelievers,  we  must  go  prepared  to 
conduct  the  discussion  on  the  basis  of  reason  and  common 
objective  evidence.  For  the  individual  believer  the  saving 
apprehension  of  the  truth,  and  the  inward  witness  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  may  be  and  are  sufficient.  But  this  is  testimony  which 
unregenerate  men  are  capable  neither  of  giving  nor  of  receiv- 
ing. Christianity  has  its  independent  evidences.  It  is  a  divine 
revelation,  as  real  as  that  of  the  kingdom  of  nature,  proved, 
independently  of  its  self-evidencing  light,  by  its  own  external 
evidences,  by  experience,  and  by  history.  We  must  show  its 
defensible  character,  and  exhibit  its  credentials  of  miracle  and 
prophecy,  or  else  it  will  be  in  vain  for  us  to  call  upon  the  na- 
tions to  receive  it,  or  hold  it  fast  when  received.  At  the  same 
time,  the  great  means  of  its  propagation  is  the  faithful  preach- 
ing of  the  Gospel  by  divinely  called  and  regenerated  men, 
thoroughly  trained  and  duly  ordained  to  the  work  of  the 
ministry. 

Bear  with  me,  I  beg  you,  for  a  few  moments  longer,  and  al- 
low me  to  close  this  address — already  too  long — with  the  re- 
cital of  a  personal  reminiscence  bearing  on  the  subject  before 
us.  Some  twenty-five  or  twenty-six  years  ago,  when  I  was  en- 
gaged in  editorial  work  at  Chicago,  on  my  way  eastward  I 
stopped  at  Pittsburgh  for  the  purpose  of  having  a  conference 
with  our  late  lamented  friend,  Dr.  A.  A.  Hodge,  then  Profes- 
sor in  the  Western  Seminary.  I  found  him  in  his  study, 
wrestling  with  Herbert  Spencer's /7>.y/  Principles  in  Philosophy; 
wrestling  as  only  he,  with  his  wonderfully  acute  intellect  and 
powerful,  analytical  mind  and  versatile  genius,  could  wrestle. 
After  the  usual  salutations,  telling  me  what  he  was  doing,  he 
said  to  me  in  tones  of  most  intense,  of  almost  agonizing  earn- 
estness: "  Either  our  old-school  theology  is  the  very  truth  of 
God,  or  else  this  man  Herbert  Spencer,  one  of  the  greatest  in- 
tellects of  the  age,  is  right.     The  truth  is  upon  the  one  side 


22  Charge. 

or  the  other."  This,  allow  me  to  say,  was  before  Spencer's 
great  thesis,  "  that  the  provinces  of  science  and  religion  are 
distinguished  from  each  other  as  the  known,  and  the  unknown 
and  unknowable,"  and  the  arguments  by  which  he  sought  to 
sustain  it — viz.:  i.  "That  human  intelligence  is  incapable  of 
any  absolute  knowledge,"  and  2.  "  The  relativity  of  all  knowl- 
edge,"— had  been  analyzed,  and  their  two  elements  shown  to 
be  inconsistent,  contradictory,  and  irreconcilable,  as  they  have 
since  been  here  in  Princeton  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  water, 
by  Prof.  Flint,  Principal  Caird,  and  others.*  Dr.  Archibald 
Hodge  was  then  doing  original  thinking  upon  the  subject. 
His  father's  great  chapter  on  the  Knowledge  of  God  had  not 
then  been  written. 

And  so,  my  brother,  as  you  take  hold  of  the  great  questions 
of  your  department,  you  will  be  called  to  grapple  with  some 
of  the  greatest  thinkers  of  the  age,  and  to  sound  the  depths 
of  some  of  the  profoundest  and  most  subtle  reasoning  of  our 
times ;  and,  as  you  go  into  the  contest  with  these  trained  ath- 
letes in  argument,  you  will  need  to  strip  and  train  for  the  con- 
flict, and  to  be  sure  to  take  no  uncertain  position,  make  no 
hasty  concessions,  and  be  well  persuaded  that  at  every  advance 
you  make  you  plant  your  foot  on  solid  ground,  as  much  so  as 
if  you  were  climbing  the  Alps,  and  that  every  blow  you  give  is 
impelled  by  a  clear  head  and  prompted  by  a  warm  heart ;  the 
one  as  enlightened  by  the  very  truth  of  God,  and  the  other  as 
dominated  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  This  Seminary,  dear  brother, 
has  now  stood  for  over  fourscore  years  for  the  Bible  as  the 
plenarily  inspired  Word  of  God,  and  for  the  Westminster 
Confession  of  Faith  and  Catechisms  as  the  Church's  accepted 
and  authorized  interpretation  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  May 
this  institution  ever  be  in  the  future,  as  it  has  been  in  the 
past,  the  same  faithful  teacher  and  able  defender  of  the  Re- 
formed theology  as  formulated  in  these  symbols  of  our  faith. 

And  finally,  my  brother,  while  Apologetics  is  the  general 
subject  of  your  chair,  yet  of  this  you  have  not  a  monopoly. 


*  See  Principal  Caird 's  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  13,  14. 


Charge.  23 

Apologetics  defends  the  truths  of  Christianity,  as  well  as  vin- 
dicates Christianity  itself.  Each  of  the  other  chairs  vindicates 
the  truth  of  God  when  assailed,  and  especially  that  portion  of 
it  confided  to  its  care.  Very  good — yea,  I  may  add,  very 
heroic — service  has  been  rendered  along  this  line,  especially 
from  the  departments  of  Old  Testament  Literature,  New  Tes- 
tament Exegesis,  and  Systematic  Theology,  in  defence  of  the 
integrity,  authenticity,  plenary  inspiration,  and  trustworthi- 
ness of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  which  the  Board  of  Directors,  as 
well  as  the  Church  at  large,  gratefully  recognizes  and  highly 
appreciates. 


THE  FUNCTION  OF  THE  REASON   IN 
CHRISTIANITY. 


INAUGURAL    ADDRESS 


WILLIAM  BRENTON  GREENE,  JR.,  D.D. 


INAUGURAL  ADDRESS. 


Mr.  President  and  Gentlemen  of  the  Board  of 
Directors : 

In  entering  formally  on  the  duties  of  the  chair  to 
which  you  have  invited  me,  let  me  express  my  apprecia- 
tion of  your  confidence  in  me. 

A  professorship  in  one  of  our  theological  seminaries 
is  no  ordinary  trust.  Its  chief  function  is  to  teach  and 
to  train  preachers  of  the  Gospel.  Because,  therefore,  it 
has  "pleased  God  by  the  foolishness  of  preaching  to 
save  them  that  believe,"  the  position  of  a  theological 
professor  must  be  as  much  more  serious  than  that  of  the 
preacher  as  the  work  of  the  medical  professor  is  than  that 
of  the  physician.  The  theological  teacher  cannot  fail 
largely  to  determine  the  spiritual  health  of  all  the  congre- 
gations of  all  his  pupils.  The  low  slate  of  practical  re- 
ligion in  Germany  is  due  to  no  cause  so  much  as  to  the 
cold  rationalism  that  has  prevailed  so  generally  in  the  theo- 
logical faculties  of  her  universities.  Moreover,  peculiar 
responsibility  rests  on  the  theological  professor  because 
of  his  relation  to  the  theological  seminary.  It  repre- 
sents a  system  which  is  on  trial.  The  world  opposes 
its  training  as  too  scholastic.  It  educates  its  students 
away  from  the  masses  that  it  will  be  their  business  to 
try  to  save.  The  church  is  beginning  to  criticise  its 
curriculum  as  too  extended.  The  preacher  ought  not 
to  give  so  much  time  to  the  study  even  of  the  Word  of 


28       The  Ftuiction  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

God,  when  the  nations  are  perishing  through  ignorance 
of  it.  The  theological  professor,  therefore,  must  vindi- 
cate the  educational  plan  with  which  he  is  identified.  If 
his  pupils  do  not  become  conspicuously  able  ministers, 
more  than  his  own  fitness  to  teach  will  be  questioned. 
The  standing,  in  the  church  no  less  than  in  society,  of 
our  whole  system  of  theological  training  will  be  weak- 
ened, a  system  which  has  produced  the  most  blessed  re- 
sults, a  system  which  is  the  choice  fruit  of  the  counsels, 
the  labors,  the  prayers,  and  the  sacrifices  of  many  of  the 
noblest  of  God's  people,  and  a  system  which  expresses 
"the  mind  of  the  Spirit." 

The  professorship  of  the  Relations  of  Philosophy  and 
Science  to  the  Christian  Religion  is  one  of  no  ordinary 
scope  and  importance.  It  deals  with  the  relations  of 
things,  and  these  are  always  more  difficult  of  apprehen- 
sion and  more  practical  when  apprehended,  than  is  the 
knowledfje  of  the  thino^s  themselves.  The  nature  of  the 
soul  or  of  the  body  is  not  so  mysterious  as  is  the  rela- 
tion of  the  one  to  the  other;  and  the  question  as  to 
what  mind  or  matter  is  in  itself  derives  its  chief  interest 
from  the  light  that  it  would  throw  on  the  relation  be- 
tween them.  It  is  this  that  is  of  vital  consequence. 
Still  further,  this  professorship  deals  with  the  relations 
to  Christianity  of  the  things  most  vitally  related  to  her. 
The  history  of  philosophy  is  almost  the  history  of  re- 
ligion, and  specially  of  Christianity,  in  its  intellectual 
character.  At  how  early  a  time  the  doctrines  of  the 
Bible  began  to  be  shaped  by  the  theosophies  of  the 
East!  In  the  scholastic  age  did  not  the  logical  forms 
of  Aristotle  mould  every  truth  of  the  Gospel  ?  Nor 
has  the  relation  of  philosophy  to  Christianity  been  less 
intimate  since.    Descartes  largely  determined  the  method 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.       29 

of  not  a  few  theological  treatises  of  the  second  half  of 
the  seventeenth  century.  Even  Locke's  Essay  on  the 
Hu77ian  Under standi7ig  regulated  the  defences  of  re- 
ligion during  the  last  century.  The  critical  philosophy 
of  Kant  and  the  intuitionalism  of  Schleiermacher,  the 
two  being  often  mixed  incongruously,  may  be  traced  in 
almost  every  theological  work  coming  out  in  Germany, 
and  are  appearing  in  the  writings  of  not  a  few  British 
and  American  divines.  A  large  party  in  the  Church 
of  England  owes  almost  its  existence  to  "  the  airy 
spirit  of  Coleridge";  and  even  among  us  many  of  our 
ministers,  and  some  of  them  the  most  useful,  are  known 
as  Coleridgeans.  Nor  need  we  go  beyond  the  sea  for 
examples  of  the  influence  of  philosophy  on  Christianity. 
The  epitaph  on  the  tomb  of  our  own  Edwards  speaks 
of  him,  not  unjustly  either  in  the  sphere  of  metaphysics 
at  least,  as  "  secundus  neniijti  niortalium "/  and  we 
know  that  for  two  or  three  generations  New  England 
theology  was  controlled,  as  the  soundest  of  it  still  is  in- 
fluenced, by  his  metaphysics.  It  could  not  be  other* 
wise.  As  Sir  William  Hamilton,  who  himself  gave  the 
most  powerful  impulse  to  one  of  the  chief  tendencies 
of  the  religious  thought  of  our  day,  has  remarked  :  "  No 
problem  has  emerged  in  theology  which  had  not  pre- 
viously emerged  in  philosophy."  The  latter,  therefore, 
must  shape  the  former. 

And  if  the  influence  of  science  on  religion  cannot  be 
traced  so  clearly,  it  is  not  because  it  has  been  less;  it  is 
only  because  it  has  been  general  rather  than  definite. 
Did  this  occasion  afford  the  opportunity  for  the  analy- 
sis and  criticism  required,  it  would  be  easy  to  show  that 
to  such  scientists  as  Bacon  and  Newton,  and  many 
others  whom  we  may  not  mention,  but  among  whom 


30       The  Ftinctio7i  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

there  ought  to  be  named,  in  this  their  home,  our  own 
Henry  and  Guyot,  Christianity  owes,  for  her  confir- 
mation and  illustration,  a  debt  which  she  has  not  yet 
appreciated  and  which  it  will  be  late  before  she  has  re- 
paid. Even  in  the  long  controversy  between  science 
and  religion,  in  itself  so  unnecessary  and  consequently 
so  wrong,  God  has  "  made  the  wrath  of  man  to  praise 
Him."  In  seeking  to  turn  nature  against  Christianity 
they  have  also  but  opened  to  her  a  new  arsenal  for  her 
defence,  a  new  treasury  for  her  enrichment.  This  is 
not  strange.  It  is  the  Holy  Spirit  who  i;ays :  "  The  in- 
visible things  of  God  since  the  creation  of  the  world  are 
clearly  seen,  being  perceived  through  the  things  that 
are  made,  even  His  everlasting  power  and  divinity." 
Thus  the  natural  is  a  true,  though  partial,  revelation  of 
the  Supernatural.  The  natural  will,  therefore,  be  essen- 
tial to  the  higher  revelations  of  Him  in  the  Written 
Word  and  in  the  Incarnate  Word;  for  God  knows  the 
end  from  the  beginning,  and  each  step  in  His  plan  of 
self-revelation  supposes  those  that  preceded.  If  we  do 
not  see  His  handiwork  in  nature,  we  cannot  recognize 
His  voice  in  the  Scriptures,  or  in  Christ  the  glory  of 
His  grace.  Hence,  the  unique  importance  to  Chris- 
tianity of  science,  the  interpreter  of  nature.  In  so  far 
as  she  discharges  this  her  true  function,  even  though 
she  denies  Christianity,  she  must  unfold  the  earlier 
revelation  with  which  Christianity  is  in  harmony  and 
on  which  it  is  based.  The  chair,  therefore,  to  which  you 
have  invited  me  may  be  said  to  be  fundamental  to  all 
the  others.  The  Bible,  the  truths  of  which  it  is  the 
chief  aim  of  them  all  to  present,  does  not  teach  either 
philosophy  or  science  in  itself;  but  it  recognizes  true 
science  as  of  divine  authority  and  necessity  in  its  own 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      3 1 

sphere,  and  it  assumes  and  so  stamps  as  divine  a  very 
definite  system  of  philosophy.  If,  then,  "science  falsely 
so  called"  or  "vain  philosophy"  became  dominant,  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  even  "  the  Word  of  God  " 
would  lack  a  foundation  essential  to  it  and  regarded  by 
itself  as  such. 

This  professorship  that  we  are  considering  has  in  this 
Seminary  been  held  by  no  ordinary  men.  It  was  created 
for  Dr.  Francis  L.  Patton,  and  after  his  acceptance  of 
the  Presidency  of  the  University  it  was  taken  by  Dr. 
Charles  A.  Aiken.  Dr.  Patton  is  so  favorably  known, 
not  only  to  you,  but  also  to  the  whole  thinking  world, 
that  anything  that  I  could  say  with  reference  to  him 
would  be  both  superfluous  and  inadequate.  My  rejoic- 
ing is  that  he  still  retains  a  connection  with  his  former 
chair,  and  my  hope  is  that  so  long  as  I  shall  be  its  in- 
cumbent he  will  continue  to  lay  the  foundation  for  it  in 
his  admirable  lectures  on  Theism.  I  could  scarcely  ac- 
cept his  place  did  I  not  feel  that  he  would  thus  help  me 
to  try  to  fill  it. 

Of  Dr.  Aiken  I  must  speak,  even  though  what  I  shall 
say  should  be  superfluous  and  inadequate.  He  is  with 
us  no  more.  He  was  my  instructor  in  the  subjects  of 
this  chair  so  far  as  they  were  then  taught  in  this  Semi- 
nary. He  will  stand  before  me  as  my  ideal  of  the  equal 
union  of  the  scholar,  the  gentleman,  and  the  Christian. 
Nor  may  I  pass  over  his  attainments  in  this  department. 
It  would  not  have  been  his  choice  had  he  chosen  his 
w^ork.  He  has  left  a  series  of  lectures  on  Pentateuchal 
Criticism,  which  show  clearly  where  his  ability  lay  and 
how  high  it  was.  And  yet  his  courses  on  Apologetics 
and  Ethics,  while  evidently  not  specially  congenial  to 
him,  were  marked  by  the  accurate  learning,  the  elegant 


32       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

culture,  and  the  beautiful  spirit  which  characterized  all 
his  work ;  and  I  am  bound  to  add  that,  after  consult- 
ing many  and  more  ambitious  books,  I  have  often 
found  in  his  old  Syllabus  their  best  summary.  Surely 
you  can  see  that  the  position  made  by  such  professors 
as  Dr.  Patton  and  Dr.  Aiken  must  be  peculiarly  re- 
sponsible. 

This,  too,  is  no  ordinary  occasion  in  the  history  of 
the  Seminary.  We  are  passing  through  a  crisis  unex- 
ampled, probably,  in  the  career  of  any  similar  institution. 
Of  the  seven  professors  who  first  welcomed  me  here  as 
a  student  sixteen  years  ago,  but  one  remains  ;  so  terrible 
have  been  the  ravages  of  death  in  that  unequalled  Fac- 
ulty. The  solemn,  the  oppressive  question,  therefore, 
confronts  us,  their  successors  and  pupils :  Shall  the 
work  which  they  did  so  well  go  forward  ?  Do  you 
wonder  that  your  new  professor,  as  he  finds  himself  in 
the  place  of  those  whom  he  revered  and  on  whom  he 
depended,  and  charged  with  developing  what  they  be- 
gan, is  awed  by  a  sense  of  loneliness  and  responsibility? 
He  could  not  have  accepted  your  invitation  had  he  not 
heard  in  it  God's  call.  He  could  not  go  on  with  his 
work,  if  he  had  not  experienced  the  heartiest  co-opera- 
tion and  the  kindest  sympathy  from  his  colleagues  in 
the  Faculty,  and  if  he  did  not  feel  sure  of  your  indul- 
gence and  specially  of  your  earnest  and  constant  prayers. 

The  subject  which  I  have  chosen  for  this  inaugural 
address  is 

THE    FUNCTION    OF    THE     REASON     IN    CHRISTIANITY. 

I  have  been  led  to  this  choice  by  three  considerations. 
Twelve  years  ago  Dr.  Patton  at  his  inauguration  defined 
the  scope  and  vindicated  the  importance  of  this  chair. 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      33 

For  me  formally  to  do  it  would,  therefore,  be  useless, 
if  not  presumptuous.  Moreover,  as  the  characteristic 
of  this  department  is  that,  while  in  all  the  others  the 
appeal  is  to  the  Bible  first,  in  this  it  is  to  the  reason 
alone  :  as  the  question  is,  not.  What  do  the  Scriptures 
say?  as  in  Exegetical  Theology;  nor.  What  are  the 
order  and  the  form  in  which  their  truths  are  developed  ? 
as  in  Biblical  Theology ;  nor,  What  is  the  system  in- 
volved in  these  truths?  as  in  Systematic  Theology;  nor. 
How  can  this  system  be  best  applied  to  the  regenera- 
tion of  society  ?  as  in  Practical  Theology;  nor  even. 
What  have  been  the  effects  throughout  the  ages  of  such 
application  ?  as  in  Historical  Theology  ;  but.  What  is 
true  in  religion  on  the  ground  of  reason  simply? — it 
would  seem  that  in  discussing  the  Function  of  the  Reason 
in  Christianity  we  should,  in  fact,  be  defining  the  limits 
of  this  chair  and  showing  its  importance.  This  depart- 
ment cannot  go  beyond  reason,  and  it  can  have  no 
higher  value  than  belongs  to  reason.  Then,  too,  the 
tendencies  of  our  age  and  the  controversies  in  our 
church  render  the  theme  selected  specially  pertinent. 
These  have  been  quite  as  much  the  result  of  the  abuse 
or  non-use  of  the  reason  as  of  a  wrong  doctrine  of  the 
"  Word  of  God."  Indeed,  the  former  has  been  the 
root  of  the  latter. 

What,  therefore,  do  we  mean  by  the  reason  ? — Some- 
times it  stands  for  that  faculty  of  the  mind  by  which  we 
reason  or  draw  inferences.  Its  exercise  is  reasoning, 
and  it  itself  is  known  as  the  Understanding.  Again, 
reason  denotes  the  mental  power  which  sees  necessary 
truth  at  once,  without  an  intermediate  process  of  reason- 
ing. As  thus  contrasted  with  the  understanding,  it  is 
called  Intuition.     Once  more,  by  certain  English  writers 


34       ^/^^  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

reason  is  used  in  a  general  sense  for  that  aggregate  of 
mental  and  moral  qualities  by  which  man  is  distinguished 
from  the  brutes.  Very  often  it  is  a  comprehensive  term 
for  intelligence,  or  for  the  cognitive  powers  of  man. 
Thus  in  the  words  of  Charles  Hodge,  it  is  the  "cog- 
nitive faculty,  that  which  perceives,  compares,  judges, 
and  infers."  This  is  the  sense  in  which  it  will  be  used 
in  this  address,  except  when  its  employment  otherwise 
is  distinctly  noted.  The  question,  then,  which  is  before 
us  is,  Plas  our  faculty  of  perceiving,  comparing,  judg- 
ing, and  inferring  any  function  in  ascertaining  and  veri- 
fying religious  truth  ?  and,  if  so.  What  is  its  function  ? 
and,  more  particularly,  What  is  its  function  in  these  re- 
spects as  related  to  the  religious  feeling,  the  conscience, 
the  Church  and  the  Scriptures  ? 

I.  The  reason  has  a  function  in  religion.  Within  its 
own  sphere  it  may  be  a  source  and  ground  and  measure 
of  relijrious  truth. 

That  this  is  so  appears,  first  of  all,  in  the  untenable- 
ness  of  the  positions  from  which  the  contrary  is  argued. 
These  are,  in  the  main,  three. 

I.  That  of  the  Agnostic.  He  holds  that  knowledge 
is  impossible  in  the  sphere  of  religion.  His  creed  is 
that  "it  is  the  glory  of  God  to  conceal  a  thing."  He 
worships  "  an  unknown  God,"  so  long  as  he  worships. 
He  appears  in  every  age.  You  meet  him  to-day,  per- 
haps, more  frequently  than  ever.  He  appeals  specially 
to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  to  Mansel,  to  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, thinkers  who  have  had  few  equals  in  our  time  and 
few  superiors  in  any  other.  Nor  may  it  be  denied  that 
he  stands  for  an  important  truth  and  because  of  it.  In 
a  most  real  sense  God  must  ever  be  "the  Great  Un- 
known."    "  Canst  thou    by  searching   find   out  God  ? 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      35 

Canst  thou  find  out  the  Almighty  unto  perfection?" 
The  error  of  the  Agnostic  is  not  the  affirmation  that 
God  can  never  be  known  fully;  it  is  the  assertion  that 
He  cannot  be  known  at  all.  This  denial,  so  far  as  it 
claims  to  be  philosophical,  is  based,  and  may  be  exposed, 
on  one  or  on  all  of  three  grounds. 

It  proceeds,  first,  on  a  false  theory  of  the  nature  of 
knowledge.  This  is,  that  to  know  anything  we  must 
know  it  in  its  essence  and  be  able  to  define  it  itself. 
Hence,  as  the  finite  cannot  know  the  essence  of  the  in- 
finite God,  and  as  He  is,  because  infinite,  that  is  with- 
out limits,  indefinable;  we  cannot  know  Him.  Would 
not  this  reasoning,  however,  bear  equally  against  our 
most  common  knowledge  ?  We  discern  no  limits  to 
the  ocean.  Yet  does  that  keep  us  from  knowing  so 
much  of  it  as  comes  within  our  vision  ?  We  do  not 
know  even  a  blade  of  grass  absolutely  or  in  its  essence. 
The  little  child  will  ask  with  reference  to  it  questions 
that  the  profoundest  scientist  cannot  answer.  Do  we, 
then,  know  nothing  concerning  the  blade  of  grass  ?  Is 
it  impossible  that  knowledge  should  be  partial  and  yet 
true  so  far  as  it  goes  ?  If  it  is,  only  God  can  know  any- 
thing ;  for  only  God  can  know  everything.  Thus  the 
Agnostic's  theory  of  knowledge  must  land  him  in  uni- 
versal skepticism.  If  he  is  consistent,  he  cannot  but 
say  with  Arcesilaus,  "  We  can  know  nothing,  not  even 
this  itself,  that  we  know  nothing." 

Again,  the  denial  that  God  can  be  known  at  all  pro- 
ceeds on  a  false  theory  of  the  condition  of  knowledge. 
This  theory  is  the  identity  of  the  subject  knowing 
with  the  object  known.  As  Mansel  puts  it,  "  Qiia^itum 
sumus  scimus  "and  "  Si?nile siniili  cognoscitur!'  H ence, 
as  we  are   not  a  part  of  God,  as  we  do   not  hold  to 


36       The  Fu7iciion  of  the  Reasoii  in  Christianity. 

Pantheism  ;  we  cannot  know  God,  we  must  hold  to 
nescience.  This  theory,  however,  is  manifestly  false. 
Knowledge  does  require  a  capacity,  a  kinship.  We 
could  not  know  God  if  we  were  not  spiritual  and  so 
akin  to  Him.  But  knowledge  does  not  depend  on 
identity  of  nature.  If  it  did,  all  knowledge,  except 
self-knowledge,  would  be  impossible.  To  know  that 
space  is  boundless,  we  should  have  to  be  boundless  ;  for 
we  can  know  only  so  far  as  we  are.  To  know  the  non- 
ego,  the  ego  would  have  to  be  the  non-ego  ;  for  like  is 
known  only  to  like. 

Once  more,  the  denial  that  we  are  considering  pro- 
ceeds on  a  false  definition  of  God  as  the  infinite  or  the 
absolute.  By  the  infinite  is  meant  the  all ;  and  by  the 
absolute  the  unrelated.  In  either  aspect,  consequently, 
God  cannot  be  known.  As  the  infinite  or  the  all,  He 
cannot  be  known  :  for  to  know  is  to  distinguish  the  ob- 
ject known  from  others  ;  and  so  if  God  could  be  known, 
He  would  not  be  the  all  or  the  infinite.  To  try  to 
know  Him,  therefore,  is  like  the  attempt  to  take  hold 
of  something  which  must  go  to  pieces  if  you  take  hold 
of  it.  In  like  manner,  God  cannot  be  known  as  the 
absolute :  for  we  can  know  only  what  is  related  to  us 
just  as  we  can  see  only  what  is  presented  to  our  eye ; 
and  so  if  God  could  be  known.  He  would  not  be  the 
unrelated  or  the  absolute.  To  endeavor  to  know  Him, 
consequently,  would  be  like  the  effort  to  see  what  must 
lie  beyond  the  range  of  vision. 

This  reasoning,  however,  though  flawless  in  itself, 
fails  because  it  is  based  on  false  premises.  There  is  no 
such  infinite,  there  is  no  such  absolute. 

There  need  not  be.  The  absolute  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  the  unrelated.     It  may  mean  that  which 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  i7i  Christianity,      t^j 

stands  in  no  such  relation  to  anything  outside  of  itself 
as  to  depend  on  it  or  be  constrained  by  it.  An  abso- 
lute sovereign  is  not  one  who  sustains  no  relations  to 
his  subjects  ;  he  is  one  who  sustains  only  such  relations 
as  he  himself  pleases.  The  infinite  need  not  mean  the 
all  because  it  signifies  unlimited.  We  may  have  an  in- 
finite line,  an  infinite  surface,  an  infinite  solid.  Space 
may  be  infinite  without  being  duration,  and  duration 
may  be  infinite  without  being  space.  Hence,  a  spirit 
may  be  infinite  and  yet  be  distinct  from  physical  forms 
of  existence  and  even  from  finite  spirits.  All  that  is 
necessary  to  his  being  infinite  is  that  no  limit  can  be 
assigned  to  him  as  a  spirit.  That  is,  when  anything  is 
said  to  be  infinite  all  that  need  be  meant  is,  not  that  it 
is  not  limited  in  the  sense  of  being  distinguished  from 
other  things,  but  that  no  limit  is  possible  to  it  as  so  dis- 
tinguished. Hence,  when  we  say  that  God  is  infinite, 
it  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  He  is  the  sum  of  all 
things,  and  so  unknowable  ;  it  may  as  well  mean  that 
He  is  a  spirit  or  person  to  whose  being  and  attributes 
as  such  a  spirit  or  persoji  no  limit  is  possible.  Though 
he  embraces  nothing  but  himself,  that  self  is  boundless. 
Again,  not  only  need  there  not  be  any  such  infinite 
or  absolute  as  the  philosophical  Agnostic  supposes ; 
there  cannot  be.  The  phenomenal  or  relative  universe 
demands  the  absolute  as  its  ground  ;  and  because  it  is 
its  ground,  the  absolute  must  have  come  into  relation 
to  it.  So,  also,  the  infinite  cannot  be  the  all.  The  two 
are  and  must  be  radically  distinct.  The  infinite  is  a 
term  of  quality;  the  all  is  a  term  of  quantity.  The  in- 
finite is  the  not-finite;  the  all  is  the  sum  of  the  finite. 
Hence,  the  one  cannot  be  the  other.  They  are  mutu- 
ally exclusive  as  goodness  and  space. 


38       TJie  Fti7iction  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

And  all  this  is  confirmed  by  consciousness.  Its 
clearest  and  strongest  testimony,  a  testimony  that  must 
be  accepted  if  we  are  to  be  justified  in  thinking,  is  to 
our  personality.  That  is,  consciousness  insists  that  the 
infinite  does  not  embrace  us,  and  so  that  it  is  not  the  all ; 
and  thus  it  exposes  the  untenablenessof  the  last  ground 
on  which  the  Agnostic  would  take  his  stand. 

2.  There  is  the  position  of  the  Mystic.  To  him  God 
is  not  incognizable  as  to  the  Agnostic,  but  is  cognizable 
only  by  an  organ  other  than  reason.  We  believe  in 
God,  though  we  cannot  prove  His  existence.  We  feel 
and  realize  spiritual  truth,  though  in  terms  and  proposi- 
tions we  cannot  express  it.  In  a  word,  religion  resides, 
not  in  the  reason  or  cognitive  powers,  not  even  in  the 
will  or  active  powers,  but  in  the  sensibility.  Such  was 
the  principle  with  which  Schleiermacher  overcame  the 
rationalism  of  Germany.  Such,  with  modifications,  was 
the  teaching  of  Theodore  Parker  and  the  New  England 
Transcendentalists.  Such,  too,  is  the  root  of  the  tend- 
ency now  so  widely  apparent  to  exalt  the  Christian 
consciousness  as  the  discoverer  and  the  test  of  truth, 
and  to  decry  the  importance  of  everything  like  system- 
atic or  reasoned  theology. 

While  admitting  that  those  who  have  thus  empha- 
sized the  importance  of  feeling  in  religion  have  in  doing 
so  done  good  service  to  it,  we  are  bound  to  deny  that 
religion  is  wholly,  or  even  chiefly,  a  matter  of  feeling. 

In  the  first  place,  feeling  is  impossible  without  the 
exercise  of  reason.  Feeling  presupposes  intelligence. 
As  Bovven  says,  "  It  is  a  state  of  mind  consequent  on 
the  reception  of  some  idea."  Schleiermacher's  feeling 
of  absolute  dependence  on  God  implies  some  knowledge 
of  Him.     How  could  we  feel  dependence  on  that  of 


The  Ftinction  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity,      39 

which  we  knew  nothing  ?  Could  a  child  feel  thus  to- 
ward his  father  if  he  did  not  first  become  aware  of  his 
father  and  of  the  relation  between  them  ?  Were  this  not 
so,  religious  feeling  could  not  be  discriminated  as  such. 
Within  the  sphere  of  feeling  proper  we  are  conscious 
only  of  pleasure  or  pain.  Here  the  rapture  of  the 
sensualist  and  the  devout  elevation  of  the  saint  are  on 
a  level.  Of  the  nature  of  its  object  feeling  itself  gives 
not  the  least  intimation.  As  it  is  its  object  that  arouses 
it,  so  it  is  its  object  that  determines  its  character;  and 
an  object  cannot  be  such  unless  it  be  known.  "  All 
feeling  must  be  able  to  justify  itself  to  some  idea." 
Hence,  the  Mystic  in  making  religion  begin  with  feel- 
ing shows  only  that  he  does  not  know  what  feeling  is. 

Nor  is  the  position  of  the  Mystic  true  even  so  far  as 
this,  that  there  is  no  place  in  religion  for  the  logical 
faculty,  the  understanding.  Because  some  of  the  truths 
of  religion  are  intuitive,  it  does  not  follow  that  all  are. 
The  idea  of  God  is  innate  ;  the  Bible  makes  no  attempt 
to  prove  His  existence  ;  many  claim  that  the  arguments 
of  theology  fail  to  prove  it.  Still,  it  will  not  result  that 
all  the  truths  involved  in  our  relations  to  Him  are  also  in- 
tuitive. Personality  is  a  fact  of  consciousness  ;  we  cannot 
demonstrate  it.  The  relations  of  the  world  about  us 
to  our  personality,  however,  are  not,  in  the  main,  facts 
of  consciousness.  These  have  to  be  ascertained  by 
observation  and  reasoning.  Thus  because  religion  is 
partly  a  matter  of  intuition  it  does  not  follow  that  it  is 
wholly  so.  Analogy  would  seem  to  suggest  that  even 
in  it  there  might  be  a  place  for  reasoning. 

This  may  be  shown  to  be  so  even  in  the  case  of  those 
religious  ideas  which  are  clearly  innate.  Take  the  idea 
of  God.     We  believe  in   Him  because  we  were  consti- 


40      The  Ftuictio^i  of  the  Reaso7i  in  Christianity. 

tuted  to  do  so.  Admit,  if  you  please,  that  in  the  last 
analysis  we  are  conscious  of  Him.  Still,  we  are  all 
aware  that  there  are  arguments  for  the  existence  of 
God,  and  that  the  profoundest  thinkers  have  been  and 
are  yet  elaborating  them.  Thus  the  fact  shows  that 
we  can  reason  concerning  even  that  which  is  intuitive 
in  religion.  It  has  been  done;  it  is  being  done.  More- 
over, the  result  proves  that  it  is  well  that  it  should  be 
done.  These  arguments  are  useful  as  replies  to  skep- 
tics. They  are  yet  more  useful  in  developing  our  in- 
nate idea  of  God.  If  they  do  not  make  it  more  certain 
that  there  is  a  God,  they  do  make  it  much  clearer  what 
God  is.  There  is  thus  both  a  place  for  reasoning  in  re- 
ligion, and  it  is  well  that  reasoning  should  be  in  its 
place.  It  will  be.  We  are  so  made  that  we  cannot 
help  endeavoring  to  systematize  and  reconcile  the  facts 
which  we  admit  to  be  true.  The  question  is  not  whether 
there  shall  be  theology,  but  what  shall  be  the  system  of 
the  theology.  Schleiermacher  may  claim  to  begin 
with  feeling,  but  his  development  is  by  logic.  Even 
extreme  Mysticism  is  itself  the  refutation  of  its  preten- 
sion. Its  feeling  depends  on  reason,  and  it  reasons 
while  it  feels. 

3.  There  is  the  position  of  the  Indifferentist  and  Ex- 
clusionist.  It  is  with  the  understanding  only,  and  not 
with  reason  as  denoting  the  cognitive  powers  in  general, 
that  he  has  his  quarrel.  He  argues  from  the  sacredness 
of  Christianity  as  a  divine  revelation.  "  It  were  pre- 
sumption, it  were  impiety,"  he  holds,  "to  reason  with 
reference  to  a  'Thus  saith  the  Lord.'  We  ought  simply 
to  listen  and  obey.  Admit  that  what  He  says  is  above 
reason,  or  even  that  it  is  contrary  to  reason  ;  it  is  enough 
that  God  has  spoken."     I    have  called  such  objectors 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      41 

Indifferentists,  since  indifference  is  commonly  the  root 
of  their  objection.  Numerous  in  all  our  churches,  they 
do  not  prize  spiritual  things  sufficiently  to  care  to  reason 
with  reference  to  them  ;  more  especially  as  it  is  hard 
work  to  reason  closely,  and  particularly  in  the  sphere 
of  reli^jion  because  of  the  grandeur  and  spirituality  of 
its  truths. 

There  are  those,  however,  who  make  the  same  plea, 
but  with  a  different  motive.  We  may  call  them  Ex- 
clusionists.  They  are  profound  thinkers,  as  G.  H. 
Lewes ;  and  some  of  them  are  also  sincerely  religious 
men,  as  Michael  Faraday.  They  would  regard  reason 
and  revelation  as  independent  and  even  as  mutually 
exclusive  authorities.  Hence,  the  latter  may  be  true, 
though  above  the  former  or  even  though  contrary  to 
it ;  and  so  there  can  be  no  place  for  reasoning  in  re- 
ligion.    This  is  beyond  its  sphere. 

This  view,  we  must  admit,  contains  much  more  than 
a  grain  of  truth.  When  God  has  spoken  we  cannot 
listen  too  reverently.  It  is  true,  but  in  another  sense 
it  is  far  from  true,  that  the  Bible  should  be  treated  just 
as  other  books.  The  question,  however,  is.  Could  it  be 
honored,  if  its  teachings  were  considered  contrary  to 
reason  or  even  above  reason  ? — No.  Take  the  case  of 
"  contrary  to  reason."  A  revelation  that  was  such  we 
could  not  respect.  We  may  believe  a  royal  proclama- 
tion simply  because  it  is  a  royal  proclamation.  We 
will  not  do  so,  however,  until  we  have  discerned  on  it 
the  king's  seal,  or  until  reason  has  been  otherwise  satis- 
fied that  it  is  a  royal  proclamation.  In  like  manner, 
though  reason  be  not  called  on  to  try  the  contents  of  a 
supernatural  revelation,  it  must  decide  as  to  the  evi- 
dence that  it  is  from  God.     Indeed,  as  there  must  be 


42       The  Function  of  the  Reasofi  in  Christianity. 

some  test  of  this,  so,  until  the  revelation  has  been 
proved  to  be  supernatural,  reason  is  the  only  test  avail- 
able. This,  however,  implies  that  the  contents  of  the 
revelation  are  rational  as  truly  as  is  its  evidence. 
Otherwise,  we  should  have  reason  proving  the  un- 
reasonable, and  so  stultifying  itself.  In  a  word,  a  reve- 
lation justifying  to  reason,  as  it  must  do  before  in  any 
event  it  may  be  received,  a  right  to  teach  what  is  con- 
trary to  reason,  is  an  impossible  conception. 

It  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  "  above  reason."  In  one 
sense,  of  course,  this  phrase  suggests  an  important 
truth.  There  is  much  in  religion,  as  in  nature,  that  we 
cannot  comprehend.  There  are  doctrines  of  the  Bible 
of  which  it  is  specially  true  that  we  can  know  them 
only  "  in  part."  They  are  too  large  for  us.  Though 
w^e  can  see  into  them,  we  are  not  able,  and  we  never 
shall  be  able,  to  reason  through  them.  "The  riches  of 
Christ"  are,  indeed,  "unsearchable."  This,  however, 
is  not  what  is  always  meant  by  the  phrase,  "above  rea- 
son." Since  Leibnitz  it  has  been  used  by  many  apolo- 
gists to  suggest  that  while  nothing  can  be  accepted  as 
revealed  which  contradicts  reason,  yet  revelation  may 
communicate  to  us  what  in  its  nature,  and  not  merely 
in  its  extent,  transcends  reason.  The  difficulty  is  not 
that  the  truth  is  too  large  for  reason  to  comprehend  ; 
it  is  that  it  is  of  a  sort  different  from  what  reason  can 
apprehend.  That  the  ocean  is  above  human  vision  be- 
cause it  is  too  broad  to  be  taken  in  by  the  eye,  illustrates 
the  true  sense  of  "  above  reason."  That  oxygen  gas 
is  above  human  vision  because  it  is  too  ethereal  to  be 
its  object,  illustrates  the  meaning  of  above  reason  in 
the  theory  that  we  are  criticising.  Now  this  view  is 
open  to  the  same  objection  that  we  noted  in  the  case 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  ifi  Christianity.      43 

of  "  contrary  to  reason."  Indeed,  what  is  above  reason 
in  tiie  sense  tiiat  we  are  considering  is  contrary  to 
reason.  We  would  not  speak  even  of  the  vast  stretches 
of  the  ocean  that  we  do  not  see  as  invisible.  Its  nature 
is  such  that  it  can  come  into  relation  to  the  eye,  thouf^h 
its  extent  is  such  that  most  of  it  lies  beyond  our  vision. 
We  would,  however,  speak  of  oxygen  gas  as  invisible. 
Its  nature  is  such  that  it  cannot  come  into  relation  to 
the  eye  ;  it  is  not  simply  beyond  vision,  it  is  contrary  to 
vision.  In  like  manner,  there  are  truths  so  far-reachinji, 
so  manifold  in  their  connections,  that  they  will  always 
be  beyond  the  comprehension  of  our  reason  ;  but  if 
there  were  truths  whose  nature  was  such  that  they  could 
not  come  into  relation  to  reason  at  any  point,  they 
would  not  merely  be  beyond  it,  they  would  be  con- 
trary to  it.  Between  them  and  it,  as  between  sight 
and  the  invisible,  there  would  be  and  could  be  only 
contradiction.  Nor  may  we  urge  that,  as  what  is  con- 
trary to  sight  may  still  be  found  true  by  some  other 
test,  for  chemistry  can  detect  the  invisible  oxygen  ;  so 
what  is  contrary  to  reason  might  yet  be  shown  to  be 
true  by  higher  revelation.  The  analogy  does  not  hold. 
In  physical  nature  there  are  many  tests  of  truth,  and  so 
what  cannot  come  into  relation  to  one  of  them  may  do 
so  to  another:  but  in  spiritual  nature  there  is  only  one 
test,  there  is  but  one  reason,  we  can  conceive  of  no 
other;  and  thus  what  cannot  come  into  relation  to  it 
so  that  reason  can  begin  to  construe  it  must  be  to  us 
utterly  unknown,  indeed  a  nonentity.  Even  a  special 
revelation  could  not  be  believed,  because  it  could  not 
be  accepted,  if  there  were  no  side  of  it  that  reason 
could  recognize  as  rational.  Faith,  as  we  shall  see  here- 
after, is  and  must  be  rational.     Indeed,  it  is  reason.     It 


44      The  Fujictioii  of  the  Reason  {71  Christianity. 

is  reason  acting  on  the  most  rational  of  all  grounds, 
divine  testimony.  Its  object,  consequently,  the  subject 
of  that  testimony,  cannot  differ  in  kind  from  the  object 
of  reason  proper.  Therefore,  to  say  that  the  Bible  can 
be  "  above  reason  "  in  the  sense  that  its  truths  belong  to 
a  sphere  which  reason  cannot  enter,  is  as  absurd  as  to 
say  that  it  can  be  true  though  "contrary  to  reason." 
Both  suppositions  are  identical,  and  so  the  former  as  im- 
possible as  the  latter.  Nor  does  all  this  imply  the  Dog- 
matism of  Wolf,  that  the  doctrines  of  the  Bible  should 
be  accepted  only  so  far  as  they  have  been  demonstrated. 
It  is  rather  the  position  of  that  master  Apologist,  Henry 
B.  Smith,  that  every  doctrine  has  its  philosophical  as- 
pect and,  therefore,  that  that  only  is  true  faith  which 
reason  introduces  and  which  even  the  understanding 
can  and  ought  to  follow,  though  it  may  sometimes  have 
to  do  so  at  an  infinite  distance. 

Such,  then,  are  the  three  grounds  on  which  it  is 
denied  that  reason  has  a  function  in  religion  :  that  of 
the  Agnostic,  that  of  the  Mystic,  and  that  of  the  In- 
differentist  and  Exclusionist ;  positions  the  manifested 
untenableness  of  which  seems  to  show  that  reason  has 
a  function  in  religion.  When  the  adversary  cannot 
make  his  point,  it  is  a  strong  presumption  that  the  case 
is  gained. 

We  will  turn  now  to  the  positive  considerations  which 
prove  this  to  be  so. 

Observe,  therefore,  that  Christianity  is  very  stimu- 
lating intellectually.  The  influence  of  the  Bible  is  not 
confined  to  rendering  men  "wise  unto  salvation."  Be- 
yond all  other  books  it  has  made  thinkers.  It  cannot 
fail  to  do  so.  The  intellect  is  enlarged  chiefly  in  pro- 
portion to  the  truths  on  which  it  is  exercised,  and  where 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      45 

can  we  find  truths  which  for  sublimity  and  profundity 
can  be  compared  with  those  of  the  Scriptures,  "  the 
deep  things  of  God"?  Now  may  it  be  supposed  that 
Christianity  has  no  place  for  the  reason  which  she,  more 
than  all  else,  has  thus  developed  ?  As  well  might  we 
think  that  a  father  would  give  his  children  their  best 
training  in  judging  for  themselves,  if  he  did  not  mean 
them  to  do  so. 

Again,  Christianity  demands  and,  since  true,  is  en- 
titled to,  the  active  service  of  the  reason.  We  are 
required  to  present  even  our  bodies  "living  sacrifices" 
to  God.  In  view  of  what  He  is  and  what  we  are,  it  is 
but  just  that  we  should.  Hence,  the  system  of  truth  in 
which  God  has  personally  revealed  His  highest  glory  is 
outraged,  if  respect  even  of  the  lowest  sort  is  wanting 
to  it.  Therefore,  though  the  assent  of  the  reason  to 
the  truths  of  Christianity  is  not  so  exalted  as  faith's 
consent  to  them,  still,  it  is  an  assent  which  is  indispen- 
sable, because  it  is  an  assent  which  is  due.  He  who  is 
satisfied  merely  to  believe  Christianity  to  be  from  God, 
who  does  not  try  also  to  understand  why  and  how  this 
is,  insults  the  God  on  whom  he  professes  to  believe. 
Anselm  has  well  said  :  '*  Negligeiitia  mihi  videttcr,  si 
postquam  confirmati  suinus  171  fide,  nan  studemus  quod 
credimiis  intelHzere" 

That  this  must  be  so  appears  from  the  nature  of  faith. 
It  is  complex.  It  is  the  consent  of  the  will  to  the  as- 
sent of  the  reason.  It  begins  with  reason  in  the  general 
sense  of  cognition  ;  for  it  must  have  an  object,  and  the 
object  to  be  such  must  be  known.  It  develops  itself 
with  the  help  of  reason  in  the  sense  of  the  logical 
faculty;  for  it  consents  to  what  rests  on  testimony 
which  it  understands  that  it  is  rational  for  it  to  receive. 


46       The  Fu7iction  of  the  Reason  hi  Christianity. 

Its  further  growth  depends  much  on  the  effort  of  the 
understanding  to  comprehend  its  mysteries.  Is  not 
such  the  child's  faith,  which  our  Lord  has  presented  as 
our  ideal  ?  The  little  one  cannot  comprehend  what 
his  father  says,  but  he  believes  it,  because  he  knows 
that  his  father  is  worthy  of  all  confidence ;  for  this  very 
reason  he  keeps  asking  the  why  and  the  wherefore  ;  he 
understands  that  his  father  could  not  teach  him  that  on 
which  it  would  be  vain  for  him  to  think  :  and  as  by 
reasoning  he  advances  in  the  comprehension  of  what  he 
had  received  simply  on  his  father's  testimony,  his  belief 
in  him,  and  consequently  his  love  for  him,  grow  in 
strength  because  in  intelligence.  Hence,  Henry  B. 
Smith  has  fitly  written  :  "  He  who  thinks  highly  feels 
deeply.  From  long  meditation  on  the  wonder  of  the 
divine  revelation,  the  mind  returns  with  added  glow  to 
the  simplicity  of  faith."  And,  consequently,  a  wholly 
unreasoning  faith  is  not  merely  a  weak  faith,  or  a  wrong 
kind  of  faith  ;  it  is  not  faith. 

Beyond  all  this,  reason  itself  is  a  divine  revelation. 
Human  knowledge  is  not  aboriginal  and  sclf-subsistent, 
but  derived.  It  issues  ultimately  from  a  higher  source 
than  the  finite  intelligence.  "  Man  is  able  to  perceive 
intuitively,  only  because  the  Supreme  Reason  illumines 
him."  "The  Aojo^^'  says  St.  John,  "is  the  light  of 
men  ;  and  coming  into  the  world  enlightens  every  man." 
Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  discursive  thought.  Reason- 
ing is  controlled  by  laws  which  God  has  established  and 
which  reveal  to  us  His  intellectual  nature.  "Our 
thoughts  are  not  God's  thoughts";  yet  when  we  really 
think,  it  is  in  accord  with  the  regulative  principles  of  His 
thought.  Logic  binds  our  thinking  because  God  is 
essentially  logical.      Besides  this,   in    natural  religion, 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christia7iity.      47 

quite  as  much  as  in  revealed,  God  is  the  object  of 
thought.  Therefore,  He  is  the  author  of  natural 
religion,  and  so  it  is  a  revelation  from  Him  as  well  as 
of  Him  ;  not  only  because,  as  we  have  just  seen,  human 
reason  has  the  ground  of  its  authority  in  the  Supreme 
Reason,  but  also  because  the  object  generally  is  the 
cause  of  the  subjective  impression,  on  account  of  the 
connection  between  subject  and  object.  Thus  our  con- 
sciousness of  God  is  not  produced  by  us,  but  by  God 
who  impresses  us.  Nor  is  this  all.  "  God  is  not  simply 
the  object  of  knowledge,  He  is  also  an  agent  who 
operates  on  the  human  mind  so  that  it  shall  have  this 
knou'ledge  of  Himself."  "  In  the  phrase  of  St.  Paul, 
God  '  reveals'  and  '  manifests'  His  being  and  attributes 
within  the  human  spirit."  There  is,  therefore,  no  dif- 
ference between  natural  and  revealed  religion  as  to  the 
source.  Both  are  equally  from  God.  The  difference  is 
as  to  the  record.  That  of  the  latter  constitutes  the 
Scriptures  ;  that  of  the  former  is  written  on  the  expanse 
of  nature  and  on  the  tables  of  the  heart. 

Now  the  question  arises.  Does  the  later  of  these 
revelations  supplant  the  earlier?  Should  the  voice  of 
reason  be  disregarded  because  the  voice  of  prophecy 
has  been  heard  ?  Such  is  not  God's  method.  He 
changes  the  use  of  things  ;  He  never  supersedes  them. 
A  revelation  still  existing,  though  it  had  served  its  pur- 
pose, would  be  an  anomaly  in  the  universe.  He  who 
knows  the  end  from  the  beginning  has  no  garret  in 
which  to  store  what  He  needs  no  longer  ;  for  He 
created  and  has  permitted  no  such  things.  That  the 
revelation  in  reason  continues,  and  specially  that,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  revelation  in  the  Scriptures  tends  only  to 
develop  it,  would  seem  to  prove  that,  as  ever  and  more 


48       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

than  ever,  reason  has  a  function  in  religion.  All  this  is 
strengthened  by  God's  method  in  the  written  revelation 
itself.  It  has  been  progressive.  It  consists  of  succes- 
sive revelations.  The  Gospel  has  followed  the  Law 
and  has  fulfilled  it,  but  it  has  not  superseded  it ;  it  has 
only  changed  its  use.  This  is  true  even  of  the  cere- 
monial requirements.  If  their  function  was  to  point 
sinners  to  "the  Lamb  of  God,"  now  that  once  for  all 
He  has  been  offered  up,  their  function  is  to  be  "the 
patterns,"  and  in  so  far  forth  the  interpreters,  of  the 
heavenly  sacrifice.  And  precisely  so,  if  God  has  given 
in  His  Word  and  in  His  Son  a  revelation  of  Himself 
which  goes  far  beyond  that  in  nature,  the  analogy  even 
of  the  supernatural  revelation  in  the  Scriptures  would 
indicate,  not  that  reason  was  no  longer  to  be  heeded, 
rather  that  in  its  more  elementary  but  as  divine  teach- 
ings we  should  seek  light  on  the  mysteries  of  grace. 

All  this  is  confirmed  by  experience.  Schiller  wrote  : 
"  The  history  of  the  world  is  the  judgment  of  the  world." 
He  would  seem  to  have  meant  much  what  our  Lord  did 
when  He  said  :  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them." 
It  is  so  in  this  case.  The  history  of  Christianity  proves 
that  reason  has  a  function  in  relio:ion. 

It  does  so  negatively.  Whenever  reason  has  not 
been  recognized  in  religion,  the  issue  has  been  evil.  If, 
under  such  circumstances,  faith  has  not  always  de- 
generated into  gross  superstition,  it  has  at  least  lost 
its  power  to  sustain  itself.  No  spiritual  movement  has 
promised  more  than  did  Pietism.  So  vigorous  was  it 
at  first  that,  as  Hurst  has  said,  "  Rationalism  in  Ger- 
many, without  Pietism  as  its  forerunner,  would  have 
been  fatal  for  centuries."  Yet  Pietism  lacked  "  a  homo- 
geneous race  of  teachers."      Its  founder,  Spener,  had. 


The  Ftcnction  of  the  Reason  in  Christiaiiity.      49 

blended  reason  and  faith  harmoniously.  His  successors 
cast  off  the  former  and  blindly  followed  the  latter. 
Hence,  Pietism  fell.  The  good  which  it  had  done  con- 
tinued ;  it  itself  disappeared. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  positive  historical 
argument.  Whenever  reason  has  been,  as  we  claim, 
rightly  honored  in  religion,  good  has  resulted.  The 
Roman  Empire  would  scarcely  have  become  a  Christian 
State  without  the  apologies  of  Justin,  of  Origen,  and  of 
Tertullian.  To  the  age  of  faith  which  succeeded  the 
time  of  Augustine  no  single  man  contributed  so  much 
as  did  this  great  Bishop  of  Hippo,  and  his  grand  work 
was  that  magnificent  effort  of  reason,  "The  City  of 
God."  If  the  divorce  of  religion  and  culture  was  one 
of  the  causes  of  the  Deism  of  the  last  century,  the  de- 
fence of  Christianity  by  Butler  and  Paley  and  their 
associates  had  more  to  do  with  the  revival  of  faith  with 
which  the  century  closed  ;  and  their  defence  was  alto- 
gether on  grounds  of  reason.  If  but  lately  the  school 
of  Tiibingen  threatened  to  banish  the  supernatural  from 
history  and  even  from  the  Gospels,  the  overthrow  of 
its  influence  has  been  followed  by  new  spiritual  life 
in  Germany;  and  this  overthrow  has  been  effected  by 
German  scholarship.  This  historical  connection  be- 
tween reason  and  faith  becomes  most  significant  when 
we  consider  the  work  of  the  Church  or  missions.  Their 
greatest  advance  has  been  associated  with  those  periods 
in  which  reason  was  duly  employed  in  religion.  As 
your  own  professor  of  Church  History  has  well  said  : 
"  The  age  which  may  be  called  by  eminence  the  age  of 
the  Apologists  was  also  the  greatest  missionary  age  of 
the  ancient  Church  ";  and  "  the  great  apologetic  work  in 
England  during  the  last  century  was  accompanied,  cer- 


50      The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

tainly  immediately  followed,  by  the  great  missionary 
movement,  which  from  that  day  to  this  has  been  gather- 
ing strength,  and  is  at  this  time  the  most  characteristic 
work  of  the  Church."  In  a  word,  we  have  but  to 
turn  to  history  to  read  the  confirmation  of  Bacon's 
remark :  "  A  little  philosophy  leads  a  man  to  atheism, 
but  a  good  deal  to  religion." 

Were  all  that  has  been  said,  however,  insufficient,  the 
sure  testimony  of  the  Word  of  God  would  still  be  for 
us  enough.  The  Bible  establishes  the  right  of  reason 
in  religion.  Max  Muller  is  correct  when  he  asserts  that 
Christianity  is  the  most  philosophical  of  all  religions. 
The  apostles,  our  Lord  Himself,  appealed  to  reason  as 
well  as  insisted  on  faith  ;  and  they  insisted  on  faith  be- 
cause they  appealed  to  reason.  Life  eternal,  we  are 
taught,  consists  in  the  knowledge  of  the  only  true  God 
and  of  Jesus  Christ  whom  He  has  sent.  If  specific 
statements  are  required,  we  have  St.  Peter's  charge  "to 
sanctify  in  our  hearts  Christ  as  Lord  :  being  ready  always 
to  give  answer  to  every  man  that  asketh  you  a  reason 
concerning  the  hope  that  is  in  you,  yet  with  meekness 
and  fear";  a  charge,  too,  which  the  general  aim  of  the 
epistle  in  which  it  occurs  shows  to  be  addressed,  not  to 
ministers  only  or  specially,  but  to  every  Christian. 

I  have  given  so  much  time  to  proving  that  reason  has 
a  function  in  religion  because  at  the  present  day  and  in 
the  Church  this  is  what  needs  to  be  established.  Our 
tendency  is  not  toward  the  sin  and  folly  of  exalting 
reason  unduly  in  religion ;  it  is  rather  toward  the  folly 
and  sin  of  acting  as  if  God,  who  is  the  supreme  reason, 
could  be  irrational.  Moreover,  in  demonstrating,  as  we 
believe  that  we  have,  that  reason  has  a  function  in  re- 
ligion, we  have  stated  the  principles  which  will  enable 


The  Function  of  the  Reasori  in  Christianity.     51 

us  now  easily  to  answer  our  second  question  ;  viz.,  What 
is  the  function  of  the  reason  in  Christianity  ?  A  source 
and  crround  and  measure  of  what  is  to  be  believed  con- 
cerning God,  and  as  to  the  duty  which  He  requires  of 
us,  to  what  extent  and  with  what  limitations  is  it  so? 

Limitations  there  must  be. 

This  is  rendered  probable  by  the  fact  that  the  great- 
est thinkers  have  so  supposed.  It  was  the  peculiarly 
wise  teacher  of  the  Hebrews  who  said,  "  No  man  can 
find  out  the  work  that  God  maketh  from  the  beginning 
to  the  end."  "The  Greek  sage  by  emphasis  declared 
that,  if  he  excelled  others,  it  was  only  in  this — that  he 
knew  that  he  knew  nothing.  It  was  the  avowed  object 
of  the  sagacious  Locke  to  teach  man  the  length  of  his 
tether.  Reid  labored  to  restrain  the  pride  of  philoso- 
phy." It  was  Kant's  design  to  show  how  little  the  specu- 
lative reason  can  accomplish.  Sir  William  Hamilton 
sought  to  prove  within  what  narrow  limits  the  thought 
of  man  is  confined.  The  metaphysician  par  excellence 
of  Oxford  has  endeavored  to  undermine  the  rational 
theology  of  both  Britain  and  Germany.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, whose  transcendent  ability  even  his  opponents  must 
admit,  holds  that  man's  highest  knowledge  of  God  is 
that  He  is  unknown  and  unknowable.  These  are  but 
specimens.  Surely  such  a  consensus  of  opinion  raises  a 
strong  presumption.  When  those  who  have  been  most 
conscious  of  limitations  to  the  reason  are  those  who 
have  striven  most  to  emancipate  it,  it  would  seem  that 
these  limitations  must  be  real. 

This  also  is  confirmed  by  history.  Whenever  men 
have  "leaned  to  their  own  understanding"  in  religion, 
spiritual  death  and  moral  corruption  have  been  the  re- 
sult.   But  two  examples  out  of  many  may  be  adduced. 


52       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

Gnosticism  was  an  early  attempt  to  blend  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  East,  or  of  Greece,  with  the  doctrines  of  the 
Gospel.  It  would  bring  the  New  Testament  into  har- 
mony with  the  speculations  of  the  philosophers.  It 
numbered  many  noble  disciples,  and  it  has  given  us 
some  noble  teaching.  It  was  the  Gnostic  Basilides  who 
said :  "  I  will  assert  anything,  sooner  than  I  will  allow 
a  complaint  or  a  slur  to  be  cast  on  Providence."  Yet 
Gnosticism  is  responsible  for  some  of  the  most  danger- 
ous errors  of  the  present  day  ;  and  though  the  term 
Gnostic  was  originally  glorious,  it  became  infamous  by 
the  idle  opinions  and  dissolute  lives  of  the  persons  who 
bore  it.  They  gave  reason  free  course,  and  it  ruined 
them  as  well  as  stultified  itself. 

The  other  example  that  may  be  noted  is  modern  Ra- 
tionalism. Behold  it  in  Germany.  Wolf,  with  whom 
it  began,  was  Christian  in  fact  as  well  as  by  name.  It 
was  with  a  holy  purpose  that  he  devoted  himself  to  the 
study  of  mathematics  ;  as  he  himself  said,  he  would  "  re- 
duce theology  to  incontrovertible  certainty."  He  meant 
no  harm  when  he  assumed  as  his  cardinal  principle  that 
doctrine  was  true,  or  fit  to  be  taught,  only  so  far  as  it 
could  be  mathematically  demonstrated.  Nor  did  the 
evil  of  his  teaching  appear  at  once  in  his  successors. 
Even  Semler,  the  author  of  the  famous  Accommoda- 
tion Theory,  which  has  done  so  much  to  impair  the 
trustworthiness  of  Biblical  Criticism — even  Semler  was 
pure  in  his  private  life,  and  little  has  been  written  that 
is  more  touching  and  edifying  than  is  his  own  account 
of  the  death  of  his  daughter.  But  he  was  all  this  in 
spite  of  Rationalism.  To  see  its  true,  because  mature, 
fruit,  we  must  look  for  it  in  such  men  as  Bahrdt ;  teach- 
ers who  took  up  the  Bible  with  sacrilegious  purpose 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      53 

and  made  it  the  plaything  of  a  vicious  heart ;  men  who, 
in  some  cases,  surrendered  themselves  to  the  corruptions 
of  the  gambling-room,  the  beer-cellar,  and  the  house  of 
prostitution  ;  persons  who,  though  professors  of  the- 
ology, were  the  slaves  of  passion  even  more  than  of 
doubt.  Behold  Rationalism  in  England  as  exemplified 
in  the  Deists.  Here,  too,  it  began  well,  so  far  as  sincerity 
and  nobility  of  aim  were  concerned.  Lord  Herbert  wrote 
to  prove  that  Christianity  as  a  revelation  was  not 
needed ;  but  on  bended  knee  he  asked  of  God  a  sign 
whether  he  should  publish  his  book,  and  he  believed 
that  he  received  one.  To  appreciate,  however,  the  awful 
moral  as  well  as  spiritual  results  of  the  "  religion  of  na- 
ture," we  have  only  to  remember  that  Hume  taught 
that  self-denial  was  mischievous;  that  Bolingbroke  said 
that  morality  was  but  selfishness  ;  and  that  even  Herbert 
asserted  that  "lust  was  to  be  blamed  no  more  than  hun- 
ger." Behold  Rationalism  in  France  as  illustrated  by  the 
Encyclopedists.  Many  of  them  were  amiable  men  ; 
some  of  them,  at  least  at  first,  were  estimable  men. 
There  were  acts  of  Voltaire  as  the  apostle  of  tolera- 
tion which  make  us  exclaim,  O  si  sic  omnia/  Hel- 
vetius  dismissed  God  from  the  world ;  but  he  was  be- 
nevolent to  the  poor.  More  quickly  and  terribly  than 
elsewhere,  however,  did  the  true  fruit  of  their  teaching 
appear.  During  the  four  hundred  and  twenty  days  of 
the  Reign  of  Terror  ''la  sainte  guillotine''  destroyed 
four  thousand  victims.  Doubtless,  Voltaire  and  his  as- 
sociates would  have  disclaimed  these  atrocities  ;  but 
what  did  their  principles  do  to  hinder  them  ?  These 
things  were  done  in  the  name  of  Reason,  and  Voltaire 
and  his  associates  made  reason  supreme. 

Why  the  results  of  Rationalism  should  be  so  awful,  a 


54       The  Fu7iction  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

study  of  the  reason  reveals.  Its  own  testimony  concern- 
ing itself  is  that  Rationalism  is  irrational.  This  is  so  be- 
cause of  three  facts : 

1.  The  human  reason  has  been  vitiated  by  human  de- 
pravity. Sin  has  darkened  the  intellect  as  well  as  cor- 
rupted the  heart.  "There  is  not  that  clear  perception 
of  truth  which  characterizes  the  angelic  intuition,  and 
which  was  possessed  by  the  unfallen  Adam."  No  one 
has  thought  seriously  and  has  not  felt  that  his  thinking 
facult}''  is  unnaturally  weak,  and  scarcely  anything  is 
more  significant  than  the  dependence  of  clearness  of  in- 
tellect on  purity  of  life.  Again,  sin  "gives  a  bias  to  the 
will  against  the  truth."  Men  do  not  like  to  retain  even 
that  knowledge  of  God  which  they  have  by  nature.  The 
history  of  religion  in  general  is  the  proof  of  this.  Once 
more,  "  sin  weakens  the  power  of  intuition  itself."  Vice, 
and,  though  to  a  lesser  degree,  sin  not  so  gross,  must 
debilitate  the  spiritual  and  rational  faculty  by  strength- 
ening the  sensuous  nature.  Finally,  "  as  part  of  the  pun- 
ishment of  sin,  God  withdraws  for  a  time  His  common 
grace,  so  that  there  is  little  or  no  intuitive  perception 
of  moral  truth."  Me  "  gives  over  to  a  reprobate  mind  " 
those  who  "  change  His  truth  into  a  lie."  If  all  this  does 
not  apply  to  those  who  have  been  born  again  "  new 
creatures"  in  Christ,  it  still  remains  true  even  of  them 
at  their  best,  that  they  "see  through  a  glass  darkly." 

2.  Even,  however,  if  the  reason  of  man  had  not  been 
vitiated  by  sin,  its  function  would  still  be  limited  ;  for 
it  itself,  like  its  subject,  is  finite.  As  compared  with 
the  infinitude  of  God,  ideal  man  would  "  be  less  than 
nothing  and  vanity."  How  presumptuous,  then,  even 
for  him,  it  would  be  to  hope  to  comprehend  God,  or  to 
"lean  to  his  own  understanding"  in  the  legitimate,  be- 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      55 

cause  necessary,  effort  to  do  so.  The  eye  that  gazes  on 
the  ocean  may  be  perfect,  but  it  would  be  folly  for  it  to 
trust  itself  for  what  lies  beyond  the  little  circle  of  the 
horizon. 

3.  Were  human  reason  both  unimpaired  and  infinite, 
it  still  would  not  be  fitted  to  solve  the  deepest  problems 
of  religion,  or  to  answer  the  most  pressing  questions  of 
human  life.  For,  after  all,  the  one  inquiry  which  will  not 
be  suppressed  is  not,  What  is  God  ?  or.  What  is  man  ? 
but  it  is,  "  How  can  man  be  just  with  God  ?"  The  con- 
sciousness of  guilt  is  universal ;  all  religions  testify  to  it. 
But  further  than  the  consciousness  of  guilt,  reason,  un- 
aided, cannot  go.  She  knows  that  God  will  "  by  no  means 
clear  the  guilty";  she  knows  also  that  He  will  never 
punish  the  guilty  beyond  their  deserts ;  she  knows,  in 
short,  that  God  will  be  absolutely  just.  This  is  involved 
in  His  nature  as  God.  Because  He  is  God,  we  are  able 
to  argue  that  He  will  always  be  just ;  He  would  not  be 
God,  could  He  be  otherwise.  It  is  not  so,  however, 
with  reference  to  His  grace.  He  must  be  just ;  He  need 
not  be  gracious.  Whether  He  will  be  or  not,  depends 
on  His  will  as  well  as  on  His  nature.  The  question, 
then,  is  not  as  to  what  He  must  do  ;  it  is  as  to  what  He 
has  decided  to  do.  This,  of  course,  can  be  known  only 
as  He  shall  inform  us.  Socrates,  therefore, — as  he 
could  reason  merely  from  God's  nature  —  was  right 
when  he  remarked  in  substance  that  we  could  not  be 
sure  whether  God  would  pardon  sin.  Tschoop,  the  Mo- 
hican chief,  was  correct  when,  having  come  to  the  Mo- 
ravians to  ask  for  a  missionary  for  his  people,  he  said  : 
*'  Do  not  send  us  a  man  to  tell  us  that  there  is  a  God — 
we  all  know  that;  or  that  we  are  sinners — we  all  know 
that ;  but  send  one  to  tell  us  about  salvation."     On  the 


56       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christia^tity. 

most  important  and  pressing  of  all  subjects,  conse- 
quently,— viz.,  redemption — reason  can  teach  us  simply 
the  supreme  need  of  it.  As  to  the  certainty  of  it,  or  as 
to  the  method  of  it,  it  of  itself  can  say  nothing.  This 
is  not  because  the  truths  of  salvation  are  above  reason, 
in  the  sense  of  unrelated  to  it ;  it  is  because  they  depend 
on  what  is  beyond  reason's  ken  until  specially  revealed 
by  God  ;  on  what  is,  not  necessary  with  Him,  but  op- 
tional with  Him. 

Two  results  of  these  limitations  require  to  be  noted  : 
On  the  one  hand,  if  religion  is  to  spring — as  it  must 
do,  to  be  true — from  the  reconciliation  of  God  to  man 
and  of  man  to  God,  reason  cannot  be  the  sole  measure 
and  ground  and  source  of  all  religious  knowledge  and 
conviction.  As  has  been  seen,  the  most  important 
knowledge  lies,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  beyond  it. 
Hence,  there  must  be  the  light  of  special  revelation  as 
well  as  that  of  reason,  and  the  supreme  failure  of  Eng- 
lish Deism  is  only  one  of  many  proofs  of  this.  Nor, 
though  not  the  source,  can  reason  be  the  measure  and 
ground  of  all  religious  truth  ;  so  that,  though  special 
revelation  is  admitted,  it  is  accepted  as  such  merely  be- 
cause reason  endorses  it.  This  is  practically,  as  before, 
to  make  reason  the  only  source  of  knowledge  in 
religion,  at  least  for  the  learned  ;  and  that  this  less 
extreme  form  of  Deism  is  no  better  than  the  other, 
is  evinced  by  the  fact  that  it  failed  as  signally. 
Nor,  once  more,  though  neither  the  source  nor  the 
ground,  can  reason  be  even  the  measure  of  all  religious 
truth  ;  so  that,  according  to  the  Dogmatism  of  Wolf, 
what  has  been  revealed  is  to  be  accepted  only  in  so  far 
as  it  has  been  demonstrated.  That  which  is  too  vast  to 
be  seen  by  us  we  may  not  expect  to  be  able  to  measure. 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  hi  Christianity,      57 

Are  we  to  believe  in  the  love  of  Christ  merely  so  far  as 
we  can  now  explain  it  ?  Is  not  the  essence  of  its 
preciousness  that,  though  we  can  know  it  in  part  and 
are  bidden  to  grow  in  the  knowledge  of  it,  it  will  always 
"  pass  our  knowledge  "  ?  As  might  have  been  supposed, 
such  dogmatism  has  invariably  developed  into  lifeless 
rationalism.  He  who  will  admit  nothing  which  trans- 
cends himself  cannot  ^row  in  likeness  to  Christ. 

On  the  other  hand,  then,  if  reason  is  to  exercise  its 
legitimate  function  as  a  source  or  ground  or  even  meas- 
ure of  truth,  there  must  be  some  rule  by  which  it  itself 
shall  be  controlled.     Where  do  we  find  this  rule  ? 

In  the  feelings.?  Should  the  reason,  as  so  many  are 
now  holding,  be  subordinated  to  the  Christian  Con- 
sciousness ?  Though  we  believe  in  election,  should  we 
deny  reprobation  if  our  feelings  rebel  against  it  ? — No. 
Our  feelings  have  been  corrupted  by  sin  quite  as  much 
as  our  reason  has  been  vitiated.  They  share  in  its 
finiteness.  There  is  not  a  limitation  which  it  has  and 
from  which  they  are  exempt.  At  best,  therefore,  they 
could  be  only  a  guide  co-ordinate  with  reason.  They 
might  not  presume  to  direct  it.  But  this  is  not  all.  In 
their  nature  the  feelings  show  that  they  themselves 
ought  to  be  controlled  by  reason.  As  has  been  seen, 
they  depend  on  it.  Even  their  character  can  be  de- 
termined only  by  it.  It  is  absurd,  therefore,  to  let  the 
feelings  decide  for  us  what  is  rational,  to  judge  that  a 
doctrine  is  not  true  simply  because  we  do  not  like  it. 
This  is  as  if  we  were  to  say  that  whatever  is  agreeable 
to  the  body  is  safe.  Then  a  man  who  is  freezing  should 
go  to  sleep,  because  he  feels  drowsy.  The  fact  is  that 
before  we  can  trust  our  feelings  in  any  sphere  we  must 
know   whether  truth    or  error  has  aroused  them,  and 


58       The  Functio7t  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

they  can  determine  this  in  religion  no  more  than  the 
freezing  man's  drowsy  feeling  can  decide  for  him  that 
it  is  a  feeling  which  should  be  heeded.  That  we  do 
not  like  a  doctrine  may  be  the  very  reason  why  we 
ought  to  try  to  hold  it.  The  heathen  "did  not  like  to 
retain  God  in  their  knowledge."  Nor  may  it  be  urged 
that  this  does  not  apply  to  Christian  consciousness. 
Though  to  a  less  extent,  it  does ;  and  it  is  bound 
to  until  Christian  consciousness  has  been  perfectly 
sanctified.  Nor  will  the  relation  of  feelinof  to  reason 
be  essentially  different  even  then.  Feeling  will  be 
perfect  because  it  will  be  perfectly  rational.  When 
God  glorifies  a  man  He  restores,  He  does  not  pervert, 
those  relations  between  his  powers,  which  relations 
are  so  divine  that  even  now  in  his  ruin  they  may 
be  seen  to  be  normal.  Were  historical  proof  of  this 
position  needed,  we  should  have  only  to  study  the  sig- 
nificant connection  between  mysticism  and  fanaticism. 

Since,  then,  the  feelings  may  not  be  reason's  rule,  may 
the  conscience  ?  May  our  sense  of  right  be  the  measure 
of  the  rational  ?  May  we  adopt  the  view  so  common  that 
he  who  means  to  do  right  will  be  right  ? — Again,  No.  Not 
less  than  reason  or  feeling  has  the  conscience  been  cor- 
rupted by  sin.  As  in  the  case  of  both  of  them,  there- 
fore, its  judgments  may  not  be  received  without  ques- 
tion. Indeed,  the  most  atrocious  crimes  are  committed 
for  conscience's  sake.  The  Hindoo  mother  casts  her 
child  to  the  crocodiles  because  she  feels  this  to  be  her 
duty.  Paul  tells  us  that  he  "verily  thought  with  him- 
self that  he  ought  to  do  many  things  contrary  to  the 
name  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth."  With  such  facts,  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  any  one  could,  as  James  Martineau  has 
done,  make  conscience  the  seat  of  authority  in  religion. 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      59 

Undoubtedly,  in  all  it  gives  the  unique  sense  of  right 
and  consequent  obligation  ;  but,  undoubtedly,  too,  in 
all  it  needs  to  be  corrected  as  to  the  particulars  of  right 
and  obligation.  Were  this  not  so,  however,  conscience 
might  not  be  elevated  as  the  standard  for  the  reason. 
Though  conscience  has  a  cognitive  element,  its  sphere 
of  coirnition  is  much  narrower  than  that  of  the  reason. 
The  function  of  the  reason  is  to  tell  us  what  is.  The 
function  of  the  conscience  is  to  emphasize  among  the 
things  that  are,  merely  those  which  also  ought  to  be. 
Thus,  for  example,  while  conscience  only  affirms  that 
we  ought  to  obey  God,  to  reason  is  submitted  the 
broader  proposition  that  God  is  sovereign.  It  would 
seem,  therefore,  that  reason  should  guide  conscience 
rather  than  that  conscience  should  determine  reason  ; 
that,  in  the  light  of  the  consequences  of  the  fact  that 
God  is  sovereign,  our  duty  to  Him  should  be  developed, 
rather  than  that  our  sense  of  right  should  decide  as  to 
the  truth  of  His  sovereignty.  Nor  is  historical  proof 
wanting,  either,  for  the  correctness  of  this  position.  No 
man  ever  exalted,  and  probably  no  man  could  have  ex- 
alted, morality  as  did  Kant.  Yet,  in  reducing  religion 
to  it,  he  destroyed  religion.  He  allowed  public  worship, 
but  only  for  the  recitation  of  moral  hymns  or  hearing 
of  moral  discourses.  He  permitted  private  prayer,  but 
only  as  meditation.  In  summing  up  all  religious  truth 
in  the  moral  law,  he  denied  those  saving  truths  in  con- 
nection with  which  comes  the  divine  power  by  which 
alone  the  law  can  be  kept.  Hence,  as  might  be  sup- 
posed, nothing  is  taught  more  plainly  by  history  than 
this — that  the  religion  of  conscience  only,  or  mere  mo- 
rality, ceases  at  last  to  be  even  morality. 

Since,  then,  neither  the  feelings  nor  the  conscience 


6o       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

can  afford  the  guide  that  reason  needs,  shall  we  find  it 
in  the  Church  ?  Because  she  is  under  the  constant  lead- 
ership of  the  Holy  Ghost,  may  it  not  be  that  reason 
should  submit  to  her  dogmas  as  to  what  is  and  must  be 
rational?  Is  not  the  Romish  position  of  the  infallibil- 
ity of  the  Church,  or  of  the  Pope,  the  true  one  ? — Again, 
No.  It  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  Holy  Spirit  should  se- 
cure perfect  holiness  or  infallibility  in  the  Church,  any 
more  than  in  the  individuals  who  compose  the  Church  ; 
and  that  He  does  not,  is  evident  from  the  painful  facts 
that  the  history  of  the  Church  is  a  record  of  sin,  and 
that  the  creeds  of  the  Church  have,  on  many  and  even 
important  points,  often  been  perplexingly  conflicting. 
Were  this  difficulty,  however,  less  serious  than  it  is, 
there  would  still  be  a  fatal  one.  Reason  lies  nearer  to 
us  than  any  other  authority,  and  so  no  other  evidence 
can  be  sufficient  to  overturn  its  testimony.  If  you  see 
a  tree  in  front  of  you,  the  only  thing  that  can  make 
you  really  believe  even  that  it  may  be  an  illusion,  is 
that  other  men,  with  eyes  as  good  as  yours,  cannot  see 
it.  Galileo  could  have  been  convinced  that  the  earth 
did  not  move  round  the  sun  only  by  astronomers  who 
could  prove,  by  his  own  mathematics,  that  he  was  in- 
correct. The  authority  of  the  Church,  because  evidence 
other  than  that  of  reason,  would  weigh  with  him  not  at 
all  in  such  a  matter.  She  might,  by  her  terrors,  force 
him  to  declare  on  his  knees  his  detestation  of  his  own 
doctrine  ;  but  she  could  not  prevent  him  from  saying, 
at  least  in  an  undertone,  as  he  rose,  "  It  does  move,  for 
all  that!"  The  only  theory,  therefore,  on  which  the 
Church  could  be  claimed  as  the  absolute  standard  for 
the  reason,  would  be  the  Hegelian  one — that  the  divine 
immanence  in  the  Church  made  her  actually  and   in  all 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.     6 1 

respects  the  divine  reason  developing  itself  on  earth. 
Of  course,  we  cannot  now  discuss  Hegelianism;  nor 
would  formal  refutation  of  it  seem  necessary  when  we 
remember  that  it  is  admitted  to  involve  such  beliefs  as 
that  "the  real  at  any  time  is  the  rational  for  that  time," 
and  that,  consequently,  "  might  makes  right."  Here, 
as  elsewhere,  moreover,  the  judgment  of  history  is  de- 
cisive. Whenever  the  Church,  whether  holding  this 
philosophy  or  not,  has  been  exalted  above  the  individual 
reason, — not  merely  as  a  divinely  appointed  teacher, 
which  she  is  in  proportion  to  her  scripturalness,  but  as 
an  absolute  authority, — reason,  instead  of  being  corrected 
and  developed,  has  been  perverted  and  dwarfed.  The 
course  of  Roman  Catholicism  teaches  no  plainer  or  more 
awful  lesson.  Even  the  Church  must  be  judged  by 
reason. 

Since,  then,  neither  the  feelings,  nor  the  conscience, 
nor  the  Church  can  afford  the  standard  that  reason  must 
have,  if  it  is  to  discharge  its  function  in  religion,  where 
shall  we  find  it?  Shall  it  not  be  in  the  Scriptures.? 
Yes;  for  they  fulfil  the  two  required  conditions.  In 
their  original  form  they  were  throughout,  even  as  to  de- 
tails of  every  kind,  absolutely  errorless  ;  and  they  were 
this  because  they  are  the  inspired  word  of  Him  who  is 
the  Supreme  Reason.  The  original  form  Providence 
has  preserved  or  restored  in  all  respects,  save  a  compara- 
tively few  of  the  merest  unessentials  in  expression. 
Thus  the  Scriptures  afford  an  adequate  standard,  and  a 
standard  of  the  same  kind  with  reason  itself.  They  are, 
consequently,  what  reason  itself,  in  its  very  nature,  de- 
mands for  its  true  development  ;  and,  hence,  nothing 
can  be  so  rational  as  for  reason  to  accept  the  Scriptures, 
and  proceed  reverently  and  humbly,  but  confidently,  in 


62       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity . 

them,  even  more  than  in  nature,  to  think  God's  thoughts 
after  Him, 

We  are,  therefore,  prepared  for  our  third  question, 
which  can  now  be  dismissed  with  a  few  concise  state- 
ments ;  viz.,  the  inquiry,  What  is  the  function  of  the 
reason  in  relation  to  the  Bible,  or  Inspired  Word  of 
God? 

On  the  one  hand,  because  of  what  we  have  seen  to  be 
true  as  to  the  dignity  of  the  reason,  and  the  importance 
of  its  function  in  religion,  we  may  affirm  as  follows: 

I.  For  all  that  logically  precedes  the  Scriptures,  as 
the  being  and  personality  of  God,  the  need  of  a  written 
revelation,  etc.,  we  must  go  back  to  philosophy,  to  reason 
pure  and  simple.  Even  the  Romenists  admit  this.  Of 
the  four  propositions  of  the  Holy  See  (December  12, 
1855)  concerning  Traditionalism  and  Rationalism,  the 
third  is:  "The  use  of  reason  precedes  faith,  and  leads 
men  to  it  with  the  aid  of  revelation  and  grace."  This 
is  evidently  true.  Though  reason  is  not  infallible,  yet 
antecedently  to  revelation,  it  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
only  instrument  of  investigation,  the  only  test.  Hence, 
Henry  B.  Smith  has  well  said  :  "  If  we  cannot  construct 
the  foundations  and  the  outworks  of  the  Christian  sys- 
tem on  impregnable  grounds;  if  we  cannot  show  the 
possibility  of  miracles,  and  of  a  revelation  ;  if  we  cannot 
prove — absolutely  prove — the  existence  of  a  wise,  intel- 
ligent, personal,  and  providential  Ruler  of  all  things : 
then  we  are  merged  in  infidelity,  or  given  over  to  an 
unfounded  faith.  If  we  cannot  settle  these  points  on 
the  field  of  open  discussion,  we  cannot  settle  them  at 
all."  Here  lies  the  great  and  the  indispensable  work  of 
the  chair  to  which  you  have  called  me.  Nor  may  it  be 
said  that  its  results  cannot  be  certain,  inasmuch  as,  since 
reason  cannot  discover  the  truths  of  revelation,  she  could 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.     63 

not  prove  the  necessity  of  them.  There  could  scarcely 
he  a  worse  fallacy.  A  man  may  he  too  sick  or  too  igno- 
rant to  find  the  remedy  that  he  needs,  and  yet  not  he  too 
sick  or  too  ignorant  to  be  aware  of  what  he  needs. 

2.  Reason  should  judge  of  the  evidence  that  the 
Scriptures  are  the  Word  of  God,  and  so  to  be  received 
on  His  authority.  Faith  in  them  as  such  is  irrational 
and  impossible  without  evidence ;  for  faith  involves 
assent,  and  assent  is  conviction  produced  by  evidence. 
Yet  here  for  the  best  results  reason  must  be  to  such  a 
degree  under  the  influence  of  the  revelation  as  to  be 
favorable  toward  its  evidence.  Otherwise,  to  what  is 
stronorest  it  will  be  blind.  One  need  not  be  a  Christian 
to  be  intellectually  convinced  of  the  divine  origin  of 
Christianity,  but  one  must  be  illuminated  by  the  supreme 
reason  of  the  Spirit  of  Christ,  if  he  is  to  feel  Him  to  be 
"God  manifest  in  the  flesh."  Nor  is  this  strange. 
Careful  investigation  may  prove  to  you  that  a  certain 
statue  is  a  Phidian  marble,  but  only  the  artist's  spirit 
can  cause  you  to  feel  that  it  must  be. 

3.  Reason  should  decide  as  to  the  actual  content  of 
the  Scriptures — what  it  is  that  their  words  convey  in  a 
fair  historico-grammatical  interpretation.  Exegesis  is  a 
rational  work.  The  guidance  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  in- 
dispensable in  it,  but  this  is  that  the  reason  of  the 
exegete  may  be  preserved  from  error.  The  right  of 
private  judgment  of  the  Bible,  one  of  the  foundation- 
stones  of  Protestantism,  is  based  on  this  function  of  the 
reason. 

4.  Reason  should  distinguish  among  the  interpreta- 
tions of  the  Scriptures  between  what  is  above  reason  in 
the  true  sense  of  beyond  it,  and  what  is  above  reason  in 
the  wrong  sense  of  out  of  relation  to  it,  or  contrary  to 
it.     That  is,  as  a  revelation  must  evince  rationally  its 


64       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

right  to  be  believed  ;  so,  as  has  been  seen,  it  itself  can 
contain  nothing  irrational  or  impossible.  In  deciding 
what  is  thus,  however,  the  reason  must  act  rationally 
and  not  capriciously.  Its  judgments  must  be  guided  by 
principles  which  commend  themselves  to  the  common 
consciousness  of  men,  such  as,  that  that  is  impossible 
which  involves  a  contradiction  ;  that  it  is  impossible  that 
God  should  do  or  command  what  is  morally  wrong  ;  that 
it  is  impossible  that  revelation  should  deny  any  well- 
authenticated  truth,  whether  of  intuition,  experience,  or 
science ;  that  it  is  impossible  for  what  reason  cannot  try 
to  comprehend  to  be  true.  All  this  must  be  so;  for 
God,  who  is  the  Supreme  Reason,  cannot  but  be  ra- 
tional and  hence  self-consistent. 

5.  Within  the  system  of  truth  drawn  out  of  the  Scrip- 
tures, reason — that  is,  the  understanding — must  shape 
the  definitions  and  develop  the  creed,  so  as  to  ward  off 
error  and  bring  out  the  truth  with  reference  to  the  par- 
ticular wants  and  philosophical  attainments  of  each  age. 
This,  as  has  been  said,  is  a  necessity  of  the  mind.  Only 
when  we  can  cease  trying  to  be  scientific,  can  we,  with- 
out inconsistency,  decry  systematic  theology  and  creeds. 
The  Socinian  and  Arminian  position,  therefore,  that  we 
should  content  ourselves  with  the  mere  statements  of 
Scripture  and  not  go  on  and  develop  the  legitimate  in- 
ferences from  them,  is  not  only  false  ;  it  is  also  impos- 
sible, as  is  evinced  by  the  notorious  fact  that  Socinians 
and  Arminians,  as  well  as  Calvinists,  have  their 
systematic  theolog^y.  Indeed,  on  but  one  condition  is 
the  course  which  they  advocate  possible,  and  that  is, 
that  there  has  been  a  loss  of  interest  in  ''the  deep 
things  of  God."  Hence,  the  clamor  even  among  us 
for  a  short  creed  to  state  only  the  truths  indispensable 
to  salvation,  is  far  from  reassuring.      It  would  seem  to 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.      65 

indicate  less  zeal  for  the  truth  as  such  and  to  forebode 
less  efficiency  in  the  service  of  Him  who  is  "the  truth." 
A  great  Scotch  theologian  has  said :  "  No  mere  simpli- 
fication of  a  belief  has  ever  conquered,  unless  the  half 
has  burned  more  brightly  than  the  whole."  Nor  may 
it  be  replied  that  the  fallen  understanding  is  not  com- 
petent to  grapple  with  spiritual  realities.  The  same 
might  be  said  with  reference  to  the  manifold  mysteries 
of  nature.  All  that  the  reply  amounts  to  is  that  in  the 
use  of  the  understanding,  as  of  every  other  power,  we 
should  constantly  seek  the  aid  of  the  Holy  Spirit ;  and 
the  question  may  well  be  raised  in  rejoinder,  whether 
God  would  have  addressed  the  Scriptures  to  human 
reason,  and  commanded  us  to  "search"  them,  and 
promised  by  His  Spirit  to  guide  us,  had  He  not  in- 
tended that  even  the  understanding  should  make  the 
effort.      It  is  the  searching  faculty. 

On  the  other  hand,  because  of  the  limitations  of  the 
reason,  we  ought  to  affirm  : 

I.  Reason  may  not  presume  by  itself  to  fathom  or 
reconcile  even  those  of  the  deep  truths  of  Scripture 
which  it  can  discern  unaided.  The  fact  is,  that  it  has 
not  been  able  to.  As  Professor  Christlieb  has  written  : 
"  Neither  in  ancient  nor  in  modern  times  has  it  been 
possible  to  find  in  the  whole  earth  a  nation  which,  with- 
out the  revelation  recorded  in  Scripture  and  by  its  own 
powers  of  thought,  has  arrived  at  definite  belief  in  one 
living  personal  God  !  "  And  this  sweeping  statement  is 
emphasized  by  Plato's  well-known  complaint,  "  How  can 
we  find  out  the  father  and  maker  of  all  this  universe?" 
There  is  a  theology  of  nature  and  of  reason  ;  but  even 
when  most  developed,  its  incompleteness  and  uncertainty 
demand  the  full  and  clear  revelation  in  the  Written 
Word. 


66       The  Functio7i  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

2.  In  particular,  reason  alone  has  nothing  to  say  as  to 
either  the  fact  or  the  method  of  human  salvation.  It 
is  even  her  function,  that  she  may  not  deceive  men,  to 
declare  that  on  this  supreme  question  she  of  herself 
knows  nothing.  When,  therefore,  God  has  revealed 
His  grace  in  the  Gospel  of  His  Son,  she  has  but  two 
things  to  do — to  point  men  to  it,  and  to  show  them  its 
wondrous  harmony  with  the  scheme  of  nature.  The 
highest  function  of  Philosophy  or  of  Science  is  to  bring 
men  to  the  cross  as  to  that  for  which  she  has  ever  been 
seeking  but  which  she  could  never  by  herself  have 
found  ;  and  then  with  them  take  her  place,  an  expectant 
reverent  learner,  before  "  the  wisdom  as  well  as  the 
power  of  God,"  and  thus  herself  be  made  "wise  unto 
salvation." 

Having  now  outlined  the  function  of  the  reason  in 
relation  to  the  Scriptures,  it  would  be  proper  to  show  in 
detail  how  this  department,  whose  special  aim  is  to  dis- 
cuss the  various  relations  of  reason  in  both  philosophy 
and  science  to  religion,  underlies  all  the  rest  of  the 
departments,  and  how,  in  turn,  each  one  of  them  con- 
tributes to  it.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  consider 
how  this  chair  should  be  conducted  so  as  to  develop 
the  scholarly  apologists  who,  as  every  age  has  needed 
them,  will  be  demanded,  we  must  assume,  by  that  on 
which  we  are  entering.  To  either  of  these  themes, 
however,  an  address  at  least  as  long  as  the  too  long  one 
to  which  you  have  listened  would  have  to  be  given. 
Let  me,  therefore,  close  with  simply  the  briefest  state- 
ment of  what,  in  my  judgment,  should  be  the  three 
supremely  important  practical  results  of  such  a  course 
of  study  as  the  existence  of  this  chair  supposes. 

These  results  have  reference  to  the  actual  work  of  the 
minister   of    the    Gospel.       For   the    purpose  of   this 


The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity.     67 

Seminary,  we  can  scarcely  repeat  too  often,  is,  first  of 
all,  evangelistic.  Indeed,  it  is  scholastic  only  for  the 
same  reason  that  caused  God  to  choose  for  the  typical 
evangelist  that  one  of  the  apostles  of  whom  alone  it 
could  be  said,  "Thy  much  learning  doth  turn  thee  to 
madness."  These  results  have  special  reference — may 
I  not  add  ? — to  the  work  of  the  missionary  ;  for,  accord- 
ing to  our  Saviour's  last  and  great  commission,  missions 
are  the  evangelistic  work  and  so  the  business  of  the 
Church.  It  has  been  the  glory  of  this  Seminary  that 
from  the  beginning  she  has  been  mindful  of  this.  May 
I  not  express  my  earnest  hope  that  with  growth  in  the 
number  of  students  and  with  the  increase  of  professor- 
ships this  missionary  spirit  will  steadily  develop  until 
every  influence  of  this  institution  shall  be  concentrated 
on  the  evangelization  of  the  nations  ?  The  practical 
results,  therefore,  to  be  expected  of  this  chair  should  be: 

1.  The  formation  in  the  rising  ministry  of  a  logical 
habit  of  mind.  We  do  not  need  so  much  philosophical 
preaching  as  we  have,  but  we  do  need  more  logical  preach- 
ing than  some  even  of  what  aspires  to  be  philosophical 
actually  is.  The  Gospel,  which  is  the  "  Wisdom  of 
God,"  cannot  be  justly  presented  when  the  laws  of 
thought,  of  divine  as  well  as  of  human  thought,  are 
violated.  Indeed,  to  be  illogical  in  preaching  is  to 
caricature  Him  whom  you  would  exalt. 

2.  The  grounding  of  our  ministers  in  that  philosophy 
which  underlies  the  Word  of  God  and  which  is  assumed 
by  it,  and  the  acquainting  them  with  that  "science 
falsely  so  called"  which  antagonizes  it.  It  is  not 
ordinarily  necessary  that  the  preacher  of  righteousness 
should  spend  his  time  in  assailing  Materialism  or  Pan- 
theism, or  any  other  -ism  due  to  human  conceit  and  in- 
consistency ;  but  it  is  necessary  that  he  should  be  so 


68       The  Function  of  the  Reason  in  Christianity. 

aware  of  the  dangers  of  these,  and  so  skilled  in  detect- 
ing the  subtle  forms  in  which  they  are  wont  to  manifest 
themselves,  that  he  will  never  dishonor  the  special 
revelation  of  God  by  unconsciously  appearing  even  to 
imply  that  it  rests  on  any  such  foundation. 

3.  And,  finally,  this  chair  ought  to  aim  to  inspire  our 
ministers  and  missionaries  with  such  holy  and  intelligent 
confidence  in  both  the  past  and  the  future  of  Christianity 
that  they  will  be  abundantly  able  to  vindicate  it,  and 
for  that  very  reason  will  feel  that  it  needs  no  apology. 
The  true  philosophy  of  religion  should  convince  us  that 
Christianity  is  "the  desire  of  all  nations."  The  study 
of  her  evidences  should  persuade  us  that  she  is  divine 
and  her  records  inspired  and  throughout  infallible,  or 
that  nothing  is  true.  The  examination  of  her  ethics 
should  prove  to  us  that  to  behold  the  "  fulfilment  of 
all  righteousness  "  we  must  turn  to  the  words  and  works 
of  her  Author.  The  investigation  of  her  sociological 
applications  and  achievements  should  demonstrate  to  us 
that  the  regeneration  of  society  requires  no  new  and 
artificial  scheme  of  life,  but  simply  the  practical  recogni- 
tion in  all  spheres  of  the  Gospel  of  Christ.  The  survey 
and  analysis  of  the  other  great  religions  should  establish 
for  us  beyond  a  peradventurc  that  Christianity  is  the 
one  wholly  true,  the  one  divinely  sanctioned,  the  one 
authoritative,  and  the  final  religion  equally  for  us  and 
for  all  men.  In  a  word,  the  entire  course  of  study 
should  so  set  forth  man's  need  of  redemption  and  the 
inability  of  reason  unaided  to  provide  or  discover  it,  that 
it  shall  be  felt  that  the  only  rational  attitude  for  any  one 
in  religion  is  that  of  humble,  reverent,  adoring  inquiry 
before  the  cross  of  Him  in  whom  "  the  wisdom  and  the 
power  and  the  grace  of  God  "  are  "  reconciling  the 
world  unto  Himself." 


wm.. 


'mm 


